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CHAPTER 1
ANTECEDENTS AND OUTCOMES OF THE INVESTMENT IN INTERNAL
AUDITING AND THE MODERATING ROLE OF FAMILY BUSINESS CULTURE
Summary of Research
Despite the recent attention and the apparent benefits of the internal auditing
function (IAF), the antecedents that lead a company to voluntarily invest in an IAF are
relatively little understood. Further, there is little research focused on the outcomes of
the investment in an IAF. In addition, most IAF research that has been conducted so far
has focused on large, publicly traded firms. However, privately held family businesses
are the major contributors to economic wealth and job creation in the United States. This
segment of the business environment provides a new and important context in which to
investigate the antecedents and outcomes of the investment in an IAF. Another critical
aspect lacking research is the impact of the culture of the family on the existence of an
IAF. The blending of family culture with organizational culture in the family business is
a key aspect that is not only different from nonfamily businesses, but also differs across
family businesses. Both essays include family business culture as a moderating variable
to provide a more detailed analysis of the differences between family businesses, as
opposed to dichotomously comparing family businesses to nonfamily businesses.
ESSAY #1:

Family Involvement, the Internal Auditing Function, and the
Moderating Role of Family Business Culture

1

2

Essay #1 extends agency theory into the area of the IAF in privately held family
businesses. The study examines the level of family involvement in ownership, top
management, and on the board of directors as antecedents to the existence of an IAF.
There are anticipated to be unique family and/or business characteristics and dynamics
that will likely result in differences as to the existence of an IAF at a business. However,
the identification and understanding of these differences is limited in extant literature. A
negative relationship is hypothesized between each of the family involvement variables
and the existence of an IAF. In addition, the strength of the negative relationship is
anticipated to strengthen as family business culture increases. This study provides
privately held family businesses with information that can be used to evaluate their
decision of whether or not to have an IAF, relative to the same decision in other family
businesses. Also, the study provides additional research results to the ongoing
controversy of agency costs in family businesses.
ESSAY #2:

Investment in Internal Auditing, Family Business Outcomes, and the
Moderating Role of Family Business Culture

Essay #2 extends the knowledge of the existence of an IAF gained in Essay #1 to
examine the relationship between different levels of investment in an IAF and family
business outcomes associated with the investment. While research has indicated that
investment in an IAF leads to beneficial outcomes in publicly traded companies, it
remains an open question as to what outcomes might exist in privately held family
businesses. Several dimensions of family business outcomes are explored: (1) objective
and subjective financial performance, (2) trust in the business and in trust in top
management, and (3) affective commitment. An integration of two theories provides the
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theoretical foundation for this study. An agency theory framework is used to examine the
relationship between the investment in an IAF and financial performance. Social
exchange theory is used to investigate potential impacts of the investment in an IAF on
trust in the business, trust in top management, and affective commitment. A positive
relationship is posited between the investment in an IAF and the outcome measures. In
addition, the strength of the positive relationships is anticipated to weaken as family
culture increases.
This research contributes to a better understanding of the outcomes of an IAF in
privately held family businesses, which are more prototypical of the prevalent type of
business in the United States and most areas of the world, unlike the large publicly traded
firms usually used in this type of research.
An electronic survey was developed to collect the data for both studies. The
survey was completed by the Chief Financial Officer (or individual in an equivalent
position) of the business.

CHAPTER 2
FAMILY INVOLVEMENT, THE INTERNAL AUDITING FUNCTION
AND THE MODERATING ROLE OF FAMILY BUSINESS CULTURE

ABSTRACT
This essay extends agency theory into the area of privately held family businesses
to add to the extant, conflicting research concerning family involvement and related
agency costs. This research examines three unique characteristics of privately held
family businesses that could influence the existence of an internal auditing function
(IAF); family involvement in ownership, in top management and on the board. Statistical
significance was identified in the association with family involvement on the board and
the existence of an IAF, however the association was positive as opposed to negative.
The study also develops a family business culture construct and investigates the potential
moderating effect of the construct in these relationships. Results indicate that the control
variables of the existence of an audit committee and having an external audit conducted
within the last two fiscal years have more influence than family involvement on the
existence of an IAF. In addition, family business culture was not determined to moderate
the relationships between family involvement in these three unique areas of family
businesses and the existence of an IAF. This research is the first step in gaining more
knowledge of the influence of family involvement and the impact of that influence on the
desire for a governance mechanism, such as an IAF.

4
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INTRODUCTION
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, 1999) defines internal auditing as, “An
independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and
improve an organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness
of risk management, control, and governance processes.” Since 2001 and the highly
publicized financial reporting fraud cases of companies such as Enron and WorldCom,
the internal auditing function (IAF) has increased in prominence. One lesson to be
learned from these publicized company collapses is that knowledge of a company’s
culture, operations, and risk profile is essential to company success and longevity (IIA,
2010).
The primary role of the IAF is to provide this crucial information to an
organization and those with oversight responsibility and therefore represents a valuable
resource for the business (IIA, 2010). Beginning in 2004, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) requires all listed companies to have an IAF (Harrington, 2004). Also, the
NASDAQ stock exchange encourages an IAF as a best practice (Harrington, 2004),
further emphasizing the importance of the function. In addition, the implementation of
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has resulted in companies placing more emphasis
on internal controls and the internal auditing function (Prawitt, Smith, & Wood, 2009).
Despite the recent attention and apparent benefits of an IAF, the factors leading a
company to decide to voluntarily invest in an IAF are little understood (Anderson, Christ,
Johnstone, & Rittenbery, 2012; Barua, Rama, & Sharma, 2010; Carcello, Hermanson, &
Raghunandan, 2005; Carey, Simnett, & Tanewski, 2000; Debicki, Matherne III,
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Kellermanns, & Chrisman, 2009; Trotman & Trotman, 2010). Carey et al. (2000)
examined factors associated with the existence of external and internal audits in family
businesses in Australia. The research revealed that internal audit was more prevalent
than external audit. The agency variables of the proportion of nonfamily management
and the proportion of nonfamily board member provided support for the existence of
external audit, but not for the existence of internal audit (Carey et al. 2000) leaving
unanswered questions related to family involvement.
While there has been some research on large, publicly traded companies, the
antecedents leading a privately held business, particularly a privately held family
business, to invest in an IAF have not been examined in great detail. This gap in our
current understanding is problematic given that family businesses play a leading role in
global economic production and employment, totaling 65 to 80 percent of businesses
worldwide (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; IFERA, 2003; Mandl, 2008). Research
in the United States has shown that family businesses generate approximately 60% of the
country’s employment (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003) and account for 50% of gross
domestic product and 78% of new job creation (Perman, 2006).
Privately held family businesses represent a new and important context in which
to investigate the IAF. Even though privately held family businesses are not required to
have an IAF, some make the decision to invest in the function. It is anticipated that
differences in the decision are due to unique family and/or businesses characteristics.
However, the identification and understanding of these characteristics as antecedents to
the decision to invest in an IAF is limited in extant literature. This study examines three
unique family involvement characteristics of privately held family businesses – namely,
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family involvement in ownership, in top management, and on the board of directors – as
antecedents that are posited to influence the existence of an IAF, while controlling for
agency related variables found to be significant predictors in prior research.
Kotter & Heskett (1992) suggest that culture refers to values (i.e., what is
considered important) that are shared by members of a group and tend to persist over
time, even when the members of the group change. Family businesses are in a unique
situation of combining the culture of the family with the culture of the organization
(business). Family culture exerts powerful influences over what family business
members do and how they interpret and respond to environmental challenges (Zahra,
Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008).
Prior literature has suggested both positive (Denison, Lief, & Ward, 2004; Miller
& Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Zahra et al. 2008) and negative (Burkart et al. 2003; GomezMejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001)
consequences from family involvement in the business. The conflicting results from
prior research related to family involvement could be due to the potential moderating
effect of the unique culture of the family, a variable often overlooked in research (Dyer,
2003; Vallejo, 2011). The nature of family culture may create advantages by providing a
highly committed workforce with shared goals and values (Dyer, 2003).
Therefore, it is suggested that family business research, where findings are apt to
be influenced by variations in goals, core values, and relationships, should include the
culture of the family among the variables of interest (Dyer, 2003; Vallejo, 2011). The
shared histories and identities of the family provide a foundation of core values and
standards of behavior that have potentially led to conflicting prior research results. In the
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context of this study, the culture of the family is anticipated to strengthen the relationship
between family involvement in the business and the existence of an IAF resulting in
family businesses making different decisions as to whether to invest in an IAF function.
This research combines the culture of the family with the culture of the
organization (business) to form a single variable titled family business culture. Inclusion
of family business culture in the study will enable the analysis of how different levels of
culture affect the strength of the relationship between family involvement and the
existence of an IAF. Denison et al. (2004, p. 63) state of family firms, “this cultural
uniqueness, if understood and nurtured, can be one of a corporation’s greatest
advantages.”
Agency theory has provided a framework for prior research related to the IAF
(Adams, 1994; Carcello et al. 2005; Carey et al. 2000; Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991) and
will be used here as well. Jensen & Meckling (1976) posited that agency costs do not
apply when a wholly owned firm is managed by the owner because the owner will make
decisions that maximize the utility of the business and the owner. However, within the
complex environment of family businesses there have been conflicting research results
using the Jensen & Meckling (1976) view. Research results have indicated that family
involvement actually creates situations of agency costs rather than negating them
(Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b; Schulze et al.
2001). On the other side of the debate, researchers have found evidence that family
involvement allows leaders to be freer and more motivated to act for the good of the
organization and its clients in the long run (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Hoopes &
Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003; Ouchi, 1980).
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Agency theory suggests that varying combinations of family involvement in the
key areas of ownership, management, and the board of directors would result in varying
levels of the desire for governance processes, such as the existence of an IAF (Carey et
al. 2000). However, this proposition has not been empirically tested in privately held
family businesses (Salvato & Moores, 2010; Trotman & Trotman, 2010), as prior
research has frequently neglected family dynamics when studying family businesses
(Dyer, 2003; Vallejo, 2011). This neglect has resulted in extant literature not providing
an analysis of the potential moderating effect of family culture related to governance
mechanisms, such as the decision to invest in an IAF.
This study analyzes the relationships between three aspects of family involvement
in the business and the existence of an IAF and investigates how family business culture
moderates the strength of these relationships. By extending agency theory into the area
of the IAF in privately held family businesses, several gaps in the literature will be
addressed. First, as recommended by Astrachan (2010), Trotman & Trotman (2010),
Debicki et al. (2009), and Carey et al. (2000), this study will investigate if less separation
between ownership and management results in less likelihood of the existence of an IAF,
as is predicted by agency theory. Second, the study will use the unique element of family
business culture as a moderator to examine more closely the dynamics within and across
privately held family businesses. This approach extends prior research, as the majority of
extant research has compared family businesses to nonfamily businesses (Allouche,
Amann, Jaussaud, & Kurashina, 2008; Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Anderson &
Reeb, 2003; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Sharma, 2004). Finally, the research will
provide privately held family businesses with previously unavailable information
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concerning the decision to invest in an IAF for various levels of family involvement and
family business culture.
The remainder of the paper is composed of three sections. The next section
provides the background, reviews the relevant literature, and develops the hypotheses.
The following section describes the research methods to be employed, details of the data
collection, analysis processes, and the results. The final section discusses the
implications of the results, the limitations of the study and provides recommendations for
future research.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The Internal Auditing Function
Recent studies have consistently found that the IAF can have a positive influence
on corporate governance, including reporting quality and firm performance (Gramling,
Maletta, Schneider, & Church, 2004). While the corporate collapses of the past and
subsequent requirements for an IAF mentioned earlier are related to publicly traded
companies, one lesson to be learned for all businesses is that knowledge of a company’s
culture, operations, and risk profile is essential to company success and longevity (IIA,
2010). The primary role of the IAF is to provide this crucial information to an
organization and those with oversight responsibilities, and therefore the IAF represents a
valuable resource for the business (IIA, 2010). Presumably these benefits would extend
to family businesses.
Despite all the recent attention and benefits of the IAF, extant research on factors
influencing a business’s decision to invest in an IAF is scarce (Anderson et al. 2012;
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Barua et al. 2010; Carcello et al. 2005; Carey et al. 2000; Debicki et al. 2009; Trotman &
Trotman, 2010). Prior research has focused primarily on the factors associated with the
existence or size (measured by the number of internal auditing staff) of the IAF (Carey et
al. 2000; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). Carcello et al. (2005) is the only study to
examine factors associated with the investment in an IAF. Carcello et al. (2005) analyzed
the internal auditing budgets for a sample of 217 mid-sized U.S. public companies. The
authors found evidence that internal audit budgets are positively related to several
antecedents including company risk, the ability to pay for monitoring, and specific
characteristics of the audit mechanisms (i.e., internal audit budget review by the audit
committee, amount of outsourcing of the IAF, and the relationship with external audit
fees).
While little is known about the role of the IAF in privately held family businesses,
the following situations offer opportunities for benefits from investing in an IAF. For
example, the desire to employ a family member may result in hiring an employee lacking
the appropriate skill set for the position (Dyer, 1986). A quality IAF could assist in these
situations by ensuring that management understands and appropriately mitigates risks
related to this adverse selection. Also, if family involvement decreases or ownership
becomes more dispersed, agency theory suggests that some form of agency costs will be
incurred. Daily & Dollinger (1992) found that the desire to maintain close control leads
family businesses to use significantly fewer formal internal control systems, instead
opting for more social methods of control. Unlike an external auditing function, the IAF
allows the family business to provide an auditing function and keep the family business
information inside the business.
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Agency Theory
While extant literature on agency theory is vast, this review of the theory will be
limited to the IAF and situations of ownership and management in family businesses.
Agency theory has provided a framework for most prior research related to the
investment in an IAF (Adams, 1994; Carcello et al. 2005; Carey et al. 2000; Wallace &
Kreutzfeldt, 1991). Studies in various countries around the world including Hong Kong
(Ng, 2005), Indonesia (Achmad, Neilson, & Tower, 2009), Australia (Bartholomeusz &
Tanewski, 2006), Lebanon (Fahed-Sreih & Djoundourian, 2006), Germany (Pieper,
Klein, & Jaskiewicz, 2008), and the United States (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Daily &
Dollinger, 1992; James, 1999b; Wang, 2006) have linked family business ownership and
governance structure to agency issues and performance.
Jensen & Meckling (1976) state that firms are merely a series of complex
contractual relationships between various stakeholders. An agency relationship occurs
when the principal (usually the owner) contracts with another party, known as the agent
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The contract involves the principal delegating some
decision-making authority to the agent. This delegation makes it possible for the agent to
have more information and the opportunity to implement decisions that could benefit the
agent but contribute to the detriment of the business and the owner (Jensen & Meckling,
1976).
Agency theory is based on the premise that principals have less information than
agents, and this fact adversely affects the principals’ ability to monitor effectively if, in
fact, the agents are appropriately serving the interests of the principals (Adams, 1994).
This gap widens as more agents assume decision-making roles. In response to this threat,
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the principal often imposes some form of monitoring device(s), which is implemented
and maintained at a cost, therefore incurring agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Jensen & Meckling (1976, p. 308) define agency costs as the sum of: “(1) the monitoring
expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures of the agent, and (3) the
residual loss.”
In addition, Jensen & Meckling (1976) posited that agency costs do not apply
when a wholly owned firm is managed by the owner because the owner will make
decisions that maximize the utility of the business and the owner. However, within the
complex environment of family businesses, extant research does not always support the
Jensen & Meckling (1976) view. Research results have indicated that family
involvement actually creates situations of agency costs rather than negating them
(Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Schulze et al. 2003b; Schulze et al. 2001).
On the other side of the debate, researchers have found evidence that family
involvement allows leaders to be freer and more motivated to act for the good of the
organization and its clients in the long run (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Hoopes &
Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003; Ouchi, 1980). Opposing research
findings could point to a potential moderator impacting the strength of the relationship
between family involvement and various outcomes. This research posits that family
business culture has the potential to impact the findings across family businesses,
producing varying research results. However, extant research examining this potential
moderator in privately held family businesses is limited.
Privately held firms do not have the disciplinary mechanism of public stock
markets and share trading prices to provide feedback related to firm performance
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(Schulze et al. 2001). The lack of these external monitoring mechanisms results in these
firms having heightened exposure to problems created by owners who have the
opportunity to harm themselves and the ones around them (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino,
2002). Two types of agency problems in family business can be distinguished. Type I
agency problems arise from the separation of ownership and management. Family firms
face less severe Type I agency problems because of the ability of the owners to directly
monitor managers (Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985;
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Type II agency problems occur when a majority shareholder
uses his/her controlling position in the business to expropriate benefits at the expense of
minority owners. Because of the family’s significant ownership and control over the
board of directors, family businesses often face more severe Type II agency problems
(Ali et al. 2007; Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
Prior research has also examined agency issues in the two categories of adverse
selection and moral hazard (Chrisman et al. 2004; Schulze et al. 2001). Adverse
selection occurs when the principal contracts with an agent who does not have the
appropriate skill, commitment, motivation, or ethics to fulfill the responsibilities of the
position. To control for this issue principals need to incur higher search and verification
costs (Chrisman et al. 2004). Moral hazard involves the commission or omission of
actions that benefit the agent at the detriment of the principal (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001;
Schulze et al. 2001). Issues of adverse selection and moral hazard result in the need for
principals to use a combination of incentives, punishments, bonding, and managerial
processes to ensure alignment of interests with the agent and to monitor the agents’
actions (Chrisman et al. 2004). Chrisman et al. (2004) refer to the processes, systems,
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and structures, set up for the purpose of monitoring and aligning interests as agency cost
control mechanisms. The IAF serves the role of such a control mechanism.
Family Involvement
In Ownership
For the purposes of this research family involvement in ownership is measured in
percentages from 0 to 100. This allows the research to examine family involvement on a
continuous scale and between family businesses, rather than dichotomously
distinguishing between family and nonfamily firms (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios,
2002). The differing levels of family involvement in ownership will increase the
variability in the research results and also allow for analyses across family businesses.
Given their private ownership structure, the family businesses utilized in this
research are free from the scrutiny and discipline imposed by capital markets. Because
the majority of privately held family businesses operate outside of standard capital
markets and consequently outside of the standard markets for corporate control, external
governance cannot limit forms of owner opportunism (Schulze et al. 2001).
However, owners of a privately held family business who are not actively
involved in the business need to have confidence that management is capable of running
the business and adapting to changing business and environmental situations so that the
business can succeed (Sundaramurthy, 2008). Owners of a privately held family business
have incentives to adopt and enforce governance practices to prevent self-control
problems of other owners and management from undermining the viability of the firm
(Schulze et al. 2001). Shleifer & Vishny (1997) suggest large, unaffiliated (non-family)
owners have strong incentives to monitor managers. As the percentage of owners not
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involved in the business increases, there is a growing concern that the managers could
depart from maximizing shareholder wealth (Chow, 1982) and instead pursue selfinterested goals. The increase of owners not involved in the business could be the result
of the need to raise capital from outside the business which could diversify ownership
(Carey et al. 2000). The increase of uninvolved owners could also occur due to the death
of an involved owner who has deeded his/her ownership to a less involved individual.
In addition, as family members retire or subsequent generations are not interested
in pursuing the family business, the business may move closer to a market model of
fewer active family members, resulting in the need for appropriate control mechanisms to
sustain the business (Lane, Astrachan, Keyt, & McMillan, 2006). An IAF can provide
monitoring and therefore transparency to any potential bias in management’s decision
making (Prawitt et al. 2009).
Based on agency theory the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: The percentage of business ownership held by members of the owning
family will be negatively related to the existence of an IAF
In Top Management
In a study of Spanish newspapers over a 27 year period, Gomez-Mejia et al.
(2001) found that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable
when the CEO being replaced was a member of the family owning the firm. The
implication is that family business owners are less willing to monitor and discipline
family CEOs. Reluctance to monitor and discipline family members can result in
managerial entrenchment where family managers remain in their positions even though
they are no longer effective (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001). When managerial entrenchment
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occurs, the possibility exists that a professional outside manager would provide greater
value to the family business.
Schulze et al. (2001) infer that agency problems may be more pronounced in
family-managed firms due to self-control or other agency threats engendered by the
unselfish concern for the welfare of others, such as altruism. Schulze et al. (2001)
conclude that it is essential that family-managed firms invest in similar internal control
mechanisms as those that are deemed necessary for widely held firms. In addition,
research has shown that, in the act of self-preservation, managers will try to neutralize
internal control mechanisms that might uncover any negative decisions (Walsh &
Seward, 1990). This could be especially true in the situation of entrenchment by a
manager in a privately held family business (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001).
However, other research results are more in agreement with agency theory.
Agency theory would suggest that a family CEO can possibly eliminate the Type I
agency conflicts that could occur between owners and nonfamily managers (Anderson &
Reeb, 2003; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) because of the
ability of the owners to directly monitor managers. In addition, family managers have
been shown to reduce uncertainty about future cash flows and therefore have longer
performance and investment horizons (James, 1999a; Laverty, 1996). The following
hypothesis is proposed:
H2: The percentage of top management positions held by members of the
owning family will be negatively related to the existence of an IAF
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On the Board of Directors
Research has yielded conflicting results when examining the potential benefits of
family versus nonfamily members on the board of directors. Insider board members can
provide rich firm-specific knowledge and strong commitment to the firm (Sundaramurthy
& Lewis, 2003). Bartholomeusz & Tanewski (2006) suggest that the mere presence of
nonfamily owners on the board of directors creates tension that will ultimately result in
reduced performance. Lane et al. (2006) state that outsider board members can be
influenced by financial incentives or recognition and therefore do not necessarily
guarantee objectivity.
On the other hand, boards comprised primarily of insiders (current or former
managers/employees of the firm) or dependent outsiders (directors who have business
relationships with the firm and/or family or social ties with the CEO) may be perceived
as less effective at monitoring others (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). Schwartz &
Barnes (1991) argue that an active board of directors with nonfamily outsiders can offer
access to information, expertise, and networks from outside the business. Sundaramurthy
(2008) states that including nonfamily members on the board of directors can assist
family businesses in drawing boundaries between the family and business systems,
enhance the quality of strategic decisions, provide a system of checks and balances, and
provide access to competencies to compete in a changing market-place.
Outside board members are able to better monitor, discipline, and even dismiss
managers since they are not beholden to the firm or the CEO for their livelihood
(Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Walsh & Seward, 1990). Well-governed family
businesses exhibit higher overall levels of outsider representation on the board of
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directors than poorly governed family businesses (Schulze et al. 2001). Based on the
previous discussion, agency theory would suggest the following hypothesis:
H3: The percentage of board positions held by members of the owning
family will be negatively related to the existence of an IAF
Family Business Culture
Kotter & Heskett (1992) suggest that culture refers to values (what is considered
important) that are shared by members of a group and tend to persist overtime, even when
the members of the group change. Family businesses are in a unique situation of
combining the culture of the family with the culture of the organization. For this
research, the culture of the organization (business) was combined with the culture of the
family to form a construct titled family business culture. Prior to discussing the
relevance of this new construct in the context of an IAF, each of the two constituting
components is addressed separately in the following sections.
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture has been defined in numerous ways. However, a common
theme is that organizational culture refers to a system of shared meaning held by
organizational members that distinguishes the organization from all other organizations
(Becker, 1982). It may be viewed as “the pattern of shared values and beliefs that help
individuals understand the organizational functioning and thus provide them with the
norms for behavior in the organization” (Deshpande & Webster, 1989, p. 4). The
importance of values in organizational culture is fundamentally linked to the process of
identity formation in which individuals seek a social connection and use this
identification to define themselves (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Past research has found
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that one key element of organizational culture is the person-organization fit in which
aspects of both the individual and the situation combine to influence an individual’s
response to a given situation (O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). When people
belong to the same organization and share perceptions about beliefs and values, they tend
to act in similar ways (Sorensen, 2002). For example, characteristics of organizational
culture, such as innovation and risk-taking, attention to detail, team orientation, stability,
and outcome orientation, strongly influence employee behaviors (Chatman & Jehn, 1994;
O'Reilly et al. 1991).
Strong organizational cultures exist when employees and management respond to
situations because of their alignment with organizational values (Deal & Kennedy, 1982).
Nemeth (1997) suggested that an unanticipated consequence of strong organizational
culture companies is the stifling of employee creativity and innovation through an intense
commitment to a set of ideas, a form of groupthink (Janis, 1972, 1982) In addition,
strong culture firms tend to excel at incremental change levels, but encounter difficulties
in more volatile environments (Sorensen, 2002).
On the other hand, Deal & Kennedy (1982) state that strong organizational
cultures can positively affect performance by instilling within employees a clear sense of
purpose and expectation that can result in increased organizational commitment,
employee motivation, and efficiency. Also, one could assume the stronger an
organizational culture, the less the need for internal controls such as an IAF. This
substitution could be the case because organizational culture reduces variability in
performance, promotes a high level of commitment to an established way of
understanding the world, and avoids the costs of disagreement surrounding organizational
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goals and the means to achieve them (Sorensen, 2002). In a study of top performing
companies, Peters & Waterman (1982) found that the stronger the culture, and the more
directed at the marketplace, the less the need for policy manuals, organizational charts, or
detailed procedures and rules. “In these companies, people way down the line know what
they are supposed to do in most situations because the handful of guiding values is crystal
clear” (Peters & Waterman, 1982, pp. 75-76).
Family Culture
Families vary greatly in their nature, composition, beliefs, and orientations,
resulting in widely varying family cultures. Family cultures exert powerful influences
over what family business members do and how they interpret and respond to
environmental challenges (Zahra et al. 2008). Family culture serves as the foundation for
the culture of the family business (Heck, 2004). In addition, Dyer (1988) indicates that
the culture of the family business plays an important role in whether the firm continues
beyond the first generation.
Culture has been empirically shown to have a significant influence on key
strategic decisions of family firms, i.e., promoting entrepreneurship and enhancing the
distinctiveness of the firm’s products, goods, and services (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato,
2004). Vallejo (2008) conducted a comparative analysis of the culture of family
businesses and nonfamily businesses in the automobile distributor sector in Spain. The
research results implied that family businesses have a stronger culture based on the fact
that they present greater commitment, greater organizational harmony, and a more longterm oriented management.
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A number of prior studies have focused on the negative attributes of family
culture on the family business. Lack of professionalization (Hall & Nordqvist, 2008),
non-reciprocal altruism (Schulze et al. 2002; Schulze et al. 2001), shirking (Gomez-Mejia
et al. 2001; Schulze et al. 2001), over-concern with wealth preservation (Carney, 2005)
and adverse selection (Burkart et al. 2003; Schulze et al. 2002) are a few of the issues that
have been researched.
Contrasting research has identified numerous positive effects of family culture in
the business. Families with strong personal ties, and identifying more closely with the
family business, create an environment enabling the firm to react to the environmental
shifts, as opposed to being passive, stagnant, or risk-averse (Miller & Le Breton-Miller,
2006; Zahra et al. 2008). Families have a devotion and passion for the business that
stems more from substantive missions and values than desire for short-term profits
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003). Employees of family businesses are often guided
more by common values than by immediate pecuniary incentives or hierarchical controls
(Ouchi, 1980).
“The literature shows consistently that family owned businesses are more value or
culture driven, more concerned with indoctrination, more apt to be caring of and loyal to
their employees, and more preoccupied with getting the full potential out of their staff”
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003, p. 130). Miller & Le Breton-Miller (2003) continue
by stating that being driven by values or culture helps establish a virtuous circle where
employees sense they are in a reciprocal, encompassing relationship with the business.
This allows mutual loyalty and commitment to grow. Sharing common values, beliefs,
and culture can provide the harmony of interests that reduces the potential of
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opportunistic behavior (Ouchi, 1980). Auditing of performance is unnecessary in this
condition, because no member will attempt to depart from organizational goals (Ouchi,
1980). In a case study of a second generation family business, McCollom (1988, p. 414)
reported that “family ties were so strong that they allowed the business to continue to rely
on informal coordination mechanisms even as the company grew rapidly.” The above
research results relating to the strength of the family business culture lead to the
following hypotheses:
H4: Family business culture will moderate the negative relationship
between the percentage of business ownership held by members of the
owning family and the existence of an IAF such that the negative
relationship will strengthen as the level of family business culture
increases
H5: Family business culture will moderate the negative relationship
between the percentage of top management positions help by members
of the owning family and the existence of an IAF such that the
negative relationship will strengthen as the level of family business culture
increases
H6: Family business culture will moderate the negative relationship
between the percentage of board positions held by members of the
owning family and the existence of an IAF such that the negative
relationship will strengthen as the level of family business culture
increases
Figure 1 displays the conceptual model operationalized.
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FIGURE 1
Conceptual Model Operationalized

Family Business Culture
Second-Order Factor Analysis (16 items)
a) F-PEC Culture Subscale
b) Denison Organizational Culture Survey
+H4

+H5

+H6

Family Involvement in Ownership
F-PEC Power Subscale (4 items)
-H1

Family Involvement in Top
Management
Number of positions and number
that are held by family (2 items)

-H2

Family Involvement on the Board
of Directors
F-PEC Power Subscale (2 items)

-H3

Existence of an IAF
Yes or No

Control Variables: Audit committee, firm size, external audit, and ownership dispersion
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METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data Collection
This research uses primary data collected via an electronic survey. The use of
surveys is consistent with prior studies investigating family businesses (Chrisman,
Gatewood, & Donlevy, 2002; Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008; Schulze,
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a). The survey was pretested utilizing family businesses that
were members of a family business center in the southeastern region of the United States.
The pretest provided the opportunity to verify the appropriateness and clarity of the
approach and the questions in the survey (Hair, Money, Samouel, & Page, 2007). The
pretest participants’ feedback was also used to determine the appropriate ranges and
scales for the responses.
It remains extremely challenging to gather financial or business process
information from privately held family businesses (Handler, 1989). There are no public
disclosure requirements for these businesses, resulting in the nonexistence of secondary
or archival data. In addition, privacy and confidentially of their information is a high
priority to these businesses. For these reasons, a private research company was retained
to gather the responses. Qualtrics (Clear Voice Research), a 100% market research only
panel, with census representation to reach hard to source groups, was utilized to gather
the responses from their panel members. This company and method of using panel data
has been utilized in prior academic research (Strauss, Griffin, & Parker, in press).
The company has approximately 540,000 panelists who respond at an average rate
of 20%. When the requested respondent pool is a hard-to-reach segment, this company
employs partnerships with other companies to reach the desired respondents, as was the

26

case with the sample for this survey. Several checks are in place to confirm the identity
of respondents including: (1) verification of all postal addresses, (2) the use of flash
cookies, and (3) the tracking of internet protocol (IP) addresses. In addition, the
company pulls a sample in quota group formats. Then simple randomization is used to
give a representative sample of new and old members within the quota groups. Panelists
are limited to one completed survey every 10 days with the research company
maintaining full records on panelist activity. Survey respondents receive a cash value
reward based on the length of the survey and the target audience requested. The reward
is credited to their member account. Once the respondent’s account value exceeds
$10.00, the respondent may redeem his/her rewards for a choice of debit cards or gift
certificates.
Respondents were asked if their business is privately held or publicly traded. For
the businesses that stated they were privately held, their responses to the questions
regarding the number of owning family members involved in ownership, in top
management, and on the board were assessed to determine if the business was a family
business. A sample of 257 respondents was obtained after the data was screened for
missing and invalid responses. The electronic survey was completed by the Chief
Financial Officer or an individual in an equivalent position in a privately held family
business that could provide financial and business structure information. The data
received from the research company was anonymous with no information linking to the
identification of the business or the respondent.
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Demographics
The demographics of the 257 respondents are presented in Table 1. The majority
of respondents were members of the owning family and have educational levels beyond
that of high school and technical college. One fourth are licensed CPAs and one half
have been with the business between five to fifteen years. Approximately half of the
businesses have had an external audit during the last two fiscal years. Additional
demographic information is presented in Table 1.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, the existence of an IAF, was defined as 1 = Yes having
an IAF and 0 otherwise. This dichotomous dependent variable was selected due to the
focus of the research to determine the influence of family involvement on the existence of
an IAF. Considering the sensitivity of business information for privately held family
businesses, this approach allowed a privately held family business to provide the
requested data while maintaining a certain level of confidentiality.
Independent Variable
The three independent variables of family involvement in ownership, family
involvement in top management, and family involvement on the board of directors were
measured by utilizing statements adapted from the power subscale of the Family – Power,
Experience, Culture (F-PEC) scale (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Holt,
Rutherford, & Kuratko, 2010; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005). The 18-item F-PEC
power subscale measures the extent of family influence in the ownership, top
management, and the board of directors of the business.
The subscale assesses the degree of influence or power held by the family and
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TABLE 1
Demographics
Panel A - Respondent Demographics

With IAF Without IAF Total
(n = 122) (n = 135) (n = 257)

Gender

Male
Female

80
42

65
70

145
112

Family Member

Yes
No

92
30

115
20

207
50

Age (In years)

Under 30
30 – 39
40 – 49
50 – 59
60 and Over

0
45
38
24
15

11
27
32
34
31

11
72
70
58
46

Highest Education

High School
Technical College
College Degree
Advanced Degree

6
9
71
36

21
17
80
17

27
26
151
53

CPA

Yes
No

41
81

20
115

61
196

Number of Years
with the Business

< 5
5 - 10
11 - 15
> 16

15
49
28
30

31
40
28
36

46
89
56
66
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Demographics
Panel B - Business Demographics

Industry

Age of the Internal
Auditing Function
(In years)

Retail
Services
Manufacturing
Wholesale
Construction
Other
< 5
5 - 15
> 15

With IAF
(n = 122)
18
44
19
11
14
16

Without IAF Total
(n = 135) (n = 257)
25
46
18
7
12
27

37
67
18

43
90
37
18
26
43
37
67
18

External Audit - Performed
by:
(n = 119)

International Firm
National Firm
Regional Firm
Local Firm
No External Audit

22
24
13
22
41

9
11
6
12
97

31
35
19
34
138

Audit Committee

Yes
No

57
65

12
123

69
188
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provides scores that can be used as independent, dependent, mediating, or moderating
variables (Astrachan et al. 2002; Klein et al. 2005). Cronbach’s alpha was ά = .75 for
past studies utilizing the power subscale (Klein et al. 2005). For this study, the power
subscale was adapted to eliminate questions that were not applicable to family businesses
in the United States and to add statements related to the number of top management
positions. The final adapted subscale included a total of eight questions: (a) four
questions related to ownership, (b) two questions related to top management, and (c) two
questions related to the board of directors.
The involvement of the family in ownership was asked as the percentage of
voting and controlling rights held by owning family members. The involvement of the
family in top management was a calculation of the total number of top management
positions currently held by members of the owning family divided by the total number of
top management positions. In addition, the involvement of the family on the board of
directors was a calculation of the total number of board members who were members of
the owning family divided by the total number of board members. Following the F-PEC
scale guidelines, family was defined as offspring of a couple (no matter what generation),
their in-laws, and any legally adopted children (Astrachan et al. 2002).
Moderating Variable
The 12 item F-PEC culture subscale (Astrachan et al. 2002) was used as one part
of the process of collecting the data to determine the moderating influence of family
business culture on the relationship between family involvement and the existence of an
IAF. The F-PEC culture subscale has been utilized in prior research to assess the extent
to which family and business values overlap and employees are committed to the
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business (e.g., Klein et al. 2005; Zahra et al. 2008). In the original scale a five-point
Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (Not at all) and 5 (To a large extent) was used for the
three statements. The other nine statements were measured on a five-point Likert-type
scale anchored by 1 (Strongly disagree) and 5 (Strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha of ά =
.93 from prior research suggests sound levels of internal consistency (Klein et al. 2005).
For this study, the original scales were expanded to an eleven-point Likert-type scale
anchored by 0 (Not at all) and 10 (To a large extent) to increase variability and precision
of the measurement (Hair et al. 2007). One double-barrelled statement was split into two
statements and one triple-barrelled statement was split into three statements, for a total of
15 items.
The Denison Organizational Culture Survey (Denison & Mishra, 1995) assesses
the organizational culture of the business in the areas of involvement, consistency,
adaptability, and mission. This survey was the starting point for the second measurement
of culture to be included in family business culture. The Denison Organizational Culture
Survey is an established, globally recognized measurement of organizational culture
(Denison, Haaland, & Goelzer, 2003; Denison & Mishra, 1995; Fey & Denison, 2003;
Yilmaz & Ergun, 2008). In addition, the survey has been used in prior research on
recognizing and leveraging the unique strengths of family culture (Denison et al. 2004).
Although organizational culture has many aspects, the extent to which family
members in the family business have shared goals and values is anticipated to moderate
the strength of the relationship between family involvement and the existence of an IAF.
Therefore, for this study the measurement of organizational culture focused on two
subsets, core values and goals and objectives, of the Denison Organization Culture
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Survey. Each of the following subsets of the original scale is comprised of five items and
uses a five-point Likert-type scale with response categories anchored by 1 (Strongly
disagree) and 5 (Strongly agree). For this study the scale was revised to a seven-point
Likert-type scale with the same anchors. The expanded scale allowed for greater
variability and precision of the measurement (Hair et al. 2007).
Core Values (subset of Consistency) measures shared core values and the ethical
code of the family as literature has repeatedly shown that family businesses are value or
culture driven (Astrachan et al. 2002; Denison et al. 2004; Vallejo, 2011). Two
statements were determined to be double-barrelled and were revised for purposes of this
study. In addition, one statement from Agreement (another subset of Consistency),
“There is a strong culture” in this organization was included as an overall measurement
of the perception of the strength of the organizational culture. The Cronbach’s alpha for
all 15 original statements of the Consistency index, including the five statements for the
Core Values subset, was ά = .79 in prior research (Denison & Mishra, 1995).
Goals and Objectives (subset of Mission) examines if goals and objectives are
understood, agreed upon, and tracked in the business. According to previous research,
lack of understanding or disagreement of the goals of the business and the goals of the
family can impair the sustainability of the business (Mahto, Davis, Pearce, & Robinson,
2010; Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997). The original 15 statements of the Mission
index, including the five statements from the Goals and Objectives subset, have exhibited
a Cronbach’s alpha of ά = .81 in extant research (Denison & Mishra, 1995).

33

Control Variables
Audit Committee – An Audit Committee may perform as a substitute governance
mechanism for an IAF or serve as a oversight entity for the internal audit and/or external
audit activities (Barua et al. 2010; Carcello et al. 2005). There are implications for the
existence of an IAF in either situation. The respondents were asked if their business had
an audit committee with a Yes/No answer.
Firm Size – Consistent with prior research the traditional characteristic of firm
size was included as a control variable (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Anderson, Francis, &
Stokes, 1993; Carcello et al. 2005; Chow, 1982; Daily & Dollinger, 1992). Firm size was
measured by the natural log of full time employees (Carey et al. 2000; Eddleston &
Kellermanns, 2007; Mahto et al. 2010).
Firm Age – Prior research has supported that as firms mature and grow, more
monitoring processes are often needed (Carcello et al. 2005; Casillas, Moreno, &
Barbero, 2010; Chrisman et al. 2004; Schulze et al. 2001). Firm age was measured using
the number of years since the inception of the business (Carey et al. 2000; Lindow,
Stubner, & Wulf, 2010; Sorenson, Goodpaster, Hedberg, & Yu, 2009).
Industry – Industry was utilized as a control variable (Chrisman et al. 2004;
Schulze et al. 2001). Five categories of retail, service, manufacturing, wholesale, and
construction were used to identify the industry sectors in which the responding firms
compete. Respondents were also permitted to indicate a category of Other to enable the
measurement of the five primary industry categories without over–specification (Casillas
et al. 2010; Lindow et al. 2010; O’Boyle, Rutherford, & Pollack, 2010). Financial
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institutions were excluded as the industry is highly regulated and may have compliance
risks that mandate an IAF.
External Audit – External audit may be a substitute or complementary activity to
an IAF (Carey et al. 2000) and therefore, impact the existence of an IAF. Participants
were asked how many external audits the business had completed within its last two
fiscal years. Six responses were available from which to select; (1) None, (2) 1, (3) 2, (4)
3, (5) 4, or (6) > 4. In addition, the respondents were asked to indicate the category of the
firm performing the majority of the external audits: (1) International, (2) National, (3)
Regional, or (4) Local.
Ownership Dispersion – Ownership dispersion was measured by asking for the
ownership percentage of the three largest owners. Prior research shows that large,
majority owners are more involved in the business and therefore, more knowledgeable
about the business resulting in a reduced desire for monitoring processes (Burkart et al.
2003; Hoopes & Miller, 2006; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Schulze et al. 2003a). This
could affect the decision to invest in an IAF (Sarens & Abdolmohammadi, 2011).
Dispersion was calculated as 100 percent minus the percentage of ownership of the three
largest owners. For example, a business with the largest owner with 50 percent, the
second largest owner with 10 percent and the third largest owner with 5 percent was
considered to be 35 percent dispersed (100 - 50 - 10 - 5 = 35).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
The summary statistics for the full sample (n = 257) and for the sub-samples of
businesses with and without an IAF are presented in Table 2. The means of family
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics of Businesses With and Without an Internal Auditing Function

Full
Sample
(n=257)

Group 0:
Without an
IAF
(n=135)
Mean

Group 1:
With an
IAF
(n=122)
Mean

t-statistics

Independent Variables
Family Involvement
in Ownership

71.30

75.111

67.074

1.855

Family Involvement
in Top Management

71.91

79.363

63.664

3.918***

Family Involvement
on the Board

17.70

10.037

26.189

-4.348***

8.02

7.951

8.099

.27

.090

.470

-7.525***

Firm Size (ln)

2.84

2.091

3.671

-5.011***

External Audit
(0=No, 1=Yes)

.46

.280

.660

-6.621***

10.51

8.874

12.320

Moderator
Family Business Culture
Control Variables
Audit Committee
(0=No, 1=Yes)

Ownership Dispersion

*** = p < .001
See TABLE 3 for variable definitions

-1.070

-1.506
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involvement in ownership and top management is higher for businesses without an IAF.
For all other variables the means were higher for businesses with an IAF. The mean
differences between the groups reached statistical significance for family involvement in
top management, family involvement on the board, and three of the four control
variables. The higher means for businesses without an IAF for family involvement in
ownership and in top management are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. The mean for
family involvement on the board is higher for businesses with an IAF which is
inconsistent with Hypothesis 3.
Table 3 displays the results of the Pearson correlation matrix. The significant
negative correlation between ownership dispersion and family involvement in ownership
is understandable given that as the three largest owners control more, the amount of
ownership dispersed would be less. The only other correlations greater than .500 were
related to firm size and were anticipated.
Moderating Variable – Family Business Culture
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed on the 26 items (15 F-PEC
items and 11 Denison items) to analyze the correlations among the items. A VARIMAX
orthogonal rotation method was employed to simplify the columns of the factor analysis
and give a clear separation of the factors. Factor loadings were considered significant at
.35 with a sample size of 257 (Hair, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Three iterations of factor
analysis resulted in the removal of three items from the Denison Organizational Culture
Survey. The remaining 23 items loaded into three factors. The three factors had
communalities greater than .500. The overall and individual item measures of sampling
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TABLE 3
Pearson Correlation Matrix

Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Existence of an IAF (a)
2. Audit Committee (b)

.43**

3. Firm Size (c)

.30** .45**

4. External Audit (d)

.38** .44** .58**

5. Ownership
Dispersion (e)

.09

6. Family Involvement
In Ownership (f)

-.12

7. Family Involvement
In Top Management (g)

-.24** -.40** -.59** .-41** -.38** .47**

8. Family Involvement
On the Board (h)
9. Family Business
Culture (i)

.29** .62** .45**

-.41** -.55** .-42** -.55**

.26** .29** .21** .26**
.07

.04

-.09

-.07

.05

-.07

-.13*

-.02

.08

.18** -.03

n = 257, * = p < .05; ** = p < .01
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

Does the business an IAF? 0 = No (n = 135) or 1 = Yes (n = 122)
Does the business have an Audit Committee? 0 = No (n = 188) or 1 = Yes (n = 69)
Natural log of full time employees
Has the business had an external audit during the last 2 fiscal years? 0 = No (n = 138)
or 1 = Yes (n = 119)
100% minus the percentage of ownership of the three largest owners
The percentage of voting/controlling family members
The percentage of top management positions currently held by family members
The percentage of board members that are members of the owning family
New construct – See Appendices A and B for more detail

Note: Family member is defined as offspring of a couple (no matter what generation),
their in-laws, and any legally adopted children.
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adequacy were greater than .500, and the three factors explained 71.93 percent of the
total variance. A Cronbach’s alpha was used as a diagnostic measure to assess the
consistency of the factors. Cronbach’s alphas of ά = .95, ά= .95, and ά = .80 provided
evidence of high internal consistency within the three factors.
A second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was utilized as the next step
in developing the Family Business Culture construct. The second-order factor model
involves two layers of latent constructs and is similar to a first-order model in that the
first-order constructs are viewed as indicators (Hair et al. 2010). Theoretically, the FPEC culture subscale items and the sub-sets of culture selected from the Denison
Organizational Culture Survey items share the same general level of abstraction.
Therefore, the first-order model meets the first requirement of theoretical justification.
Secondly, the three factors developed in the first-order factor analysis are expected to
influence other related constructs in the same way. And finally, at least three first-order
constructs can be used in order to meet the minimum conditions for identification and
good measurement practice (Hair et al. 2010).
The second-order factor analysis was conducted in AMOS 17.0. The model with
the best fit was developed by reviewing the Modification Indices (Standardized
Regression Weights, known as factor loadings in SPSS) and removing the variables with
the largest amounts in order to improve the model fit. Seven iterations were completed
with an item removed in each stage. The final model consisted of 16 items, had a Root
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of .079, a normed Chi-Square
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(CMIN/DF) of 2.6, and a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .96 indicating acceptable model
fit (Hair et al. 2010).
Convergent validity, the extent to which indicators of a construct converge or
share variance, was tested by assessing the loading estimates. Three loadings,
Standardized Regression Weights, did have amounts slightly below the .700
recommended amount, but were still above the .50 acceptable amount (Hair et al. 2010).
Internal reliability was verified by a Cronbach’s alpha of ά= .94. Appendix A displays
the final CFA model. The rectangle boxes on Appendix A include the Statement
numbers that refer to the complete Statements in the Statement # column in Appendix B.
For example, box S23_3 on Appendix A refers to S23_3 in the Statement # column of
Appendix B. Appendix B includes: (1) the original scale statements, (2) the revised
statements that were included in this survey, (3) the iterations completed in the EFA and
second-order CFA, and (4) the final loadings.
The average summated score was calculated for the remaining16 items of the
Family Business Culture construct, resulting in an average level of Family Business
Culture for each respondent.
Statistical Analysis
The model consists of a dichotomous dependent variable (1 = Yes if the existence
of IAF and 0 otherwise), three independent variables (family involvement in ownership,
in top management, and on the board), one moderator variable (family business culture),
three interactions (each independent variable * the moderator variable) and four control
variables. The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable leads to logistical
regression as the preferred statistical method for testing the proposed relationships (Hair
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et al. 2010). Unlike multiple regression and discriminant analysis, which rely on the
assumptions of normality, logistic regression is more robust when these assumptions are
not met (Hair et al. 2010). This method is designed to predict the probability of an event
occurring and can easily incorporate both metric and nonmetric independent and control
variables (Hair et al. 2010).
The total sample of 257 responses was randomly divided into an analysis sample
of n=130 and a holdout sample of n=127. The number in each sample is similar to ensure
the recommended minimum number of 10 observations per estimated parameter in both
samples (Hair et al. 2010). Three approaches were used to assess the overall fit of both
the logistic regression samples; (1) statistical measures, (2) pseudo R² measures, and (3)
classification accuracy as expressed by the hit ratio.
Analysis Sample
A null model without any independent variables was calculated to serve as a
baseline for evaluating improvements to model fit. The independent variables, control
variables, the moderator variable, and three interaction terms were then added to the
analysis model and the statistical significance of the -2 Log likelihood (-2LL) was
assessed. The difference between the initial -2LL and the final -2LL was equal to the
model chi-square statistic used in the test of overall statistical significance of the model.
In this model the -2LL was statistical significant at chi-square 53.886 (p < .001)
indicating that the variables were significant in improving the model estimation fit. Two
pseudo R² measures, based on the reduction in -2LL, were calculated. The Cox and Snell
R² value equaled .339 and the Nagelkerke R² value equaled .457. These values indicate
good model fit when compared to R² values found in multiple regression. The final
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analysis model reduced the significance level of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test to .694
n.s. This nonsignifcant value indicates that the analysis model fit is acceptable.
The initial hit ratio of 58.5 percent in the analysis model improved to 78.5 percent
in the final model for an increase of greater than 25 percent (58.5 * 1.25 = 73.13). The
proportional chance criterion was derived by calculating the proportion of observations
for each group based on the number of observations in each group in the Classification
Table at Block 0 and then squaring and summing the proportion of cases in each group.
The formula is
CPRO = p² + (1 - p)²
where

p = proportion of observations in group 1
1 – p = proportion of observations in group 2

The calculation for the analysis sample results in 51.43 percent (.5846² + (1 - .5846)² =
.34178 +.17254). In addition, the classification accuracy should be at least 25 percent
greater than that achieved by chance (Hair et al. 2010). The analysis sample actual
prediction accuracy of 78.50 percent is more than 25 percent greater than the percent
proportional chance criterion indicating internal validity (51.43 * 1.25 = 64.29). The
prediction accuracy of 78.50 percent is also 25 percent greater than the maximum chance
criterion for the analysis sample calculated at 50.00 percent (65/130 = .5000).
Holdout Sample
The holdout sample of 127 observations was tested next following the same steps
listed above for the analysis sample. The -2LL reduction was once again statistically
significant with a chi-square of 50.572 (p < .001). The Cox & Snell R² value equaled
.328 and the Nagelkerke R² equaled .439 accounting for 33 percent and 44 percent of the
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variation in the dependent measure. The Hosmer and Lemeshow significance level was
reduced to .426 n.s. for the holdout model indicating that model fit is acceptable.
The final hit ratio of 74.80 percent was more than 25 percent greater than the
initial hit ratio of 53.50 percent (53.50 * 1.25 = 66.88). In addition, the 74.80 percent hit
ratio was also 25 percent greater than the proportional chance criterion of 50.25 percent
(50.25 * 1.25 = 62.81). Once again, the final hit ratio is 25 percent greater than the
maximum chance criterion of 41.73 (53/127 = 41.73) indicating validity of the model.
Hypotheses Testing
Neither Hypothesis 1predicting a negative association between family
involvement in ownership and the existence of an IAF, nor Hypothesis 2 predicting a
negative association between family involvement in top management and the existence of
an IAF were supported. Statistical significance was identified in the association with
family involvement on the board and the existence of an IAF; however the association
was positive as opposed to negative as predicted by Hypothesis 3. The results of
Hypothesis 3 indicate that a one unit increase in family involvement on the board
increases the likelihood, on average, by 2 percent (Exp(B) = 1.020, (1.020-1.0)*100 = 2
percent) of the existence of an IAF.
Neither the moderator nor interaction effects revealed statistical significance
resulting in Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 not being supported. The existence of an audit
committee and having had an external audit during the last two fiscal years are better
predictors of the existence of an IAF than involvement of the family. With the reference
points for the dichotomous variables set at 1 = Yes, calculating the percentage change in
odds reveals that businesses without an audit committee are 79.8%, on average, less
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likely to have an IAF (Exp(B) = .202, (.202 – 1.0) * 100) than businesses with an audit
committee. In addition, businesses that have not had an external audit during the last two
fiscal years are 67%, on average, less likely to have an IAF (Exp(B) = .330, (.330 – 1.0) *
100) than businesses not having had an external audit during the last two fiscal years.
The results of the logistic regression are included in Table 4.
Additional Validation
The discriminatory power of the analysis sample compared to a holdout sample
was statistically tested using Press’s Q statistic. The statistic compares the number of
correct classifications with the total sample size and the number of groups using the
following formula:

where:

[ N – (nK)]²
Press’s Q =
N (K – 1)
N = Total sample size
n = number of observations correctly classified
K = number of groups

Press’s Q analysis sample = [130 – (102 * 2)]² = 42.12
130 – (2 – 1)

Press’s Q holdout sample = [127 – (95 * 2)]² = 31.25
127 – (2 – 1)

If the calculated Press’s Q value exceeds the critical value, then the classification can be
recognized as statistically better than chance. The critical value is defined as the chisquare value for one degree of freedom at the desired confidence level. The critical value
at a significance level of .01 equals 6.63. Therefore, the hit ratios for both the analysis
and holdout samples exceed the all comparison standards and exhibit internal and
external validity.
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TABLE 4
Logistic Regression

Variables

B

S.E.

Wald

Sig

Exp(B)

.007
-.014
.020

.009
.010
.008

.578
2.237
5.919*

.447
.135
.015

1.007
.986
1.020

.170

.228

.556

.456

1.185

-.002

.007

.066

.797

.998

.002

.006

.143

.705

1.002

.005

.006

.652

.419

1.005

-1.600
.194
-1.107
-.037

.692
.164
.559
.019

5.345*
1.402
3.928*
3.578

.021
.236
.047
.059

.202
1.214
.330
.964

Independent Variables
Family Involvement in Ownership
Family Involvement in Top Mgt
Family Involvement on the Board
Moderator
Family Business Culture
Interactions
Family Involvement in Ownership x
Family Business Culture
Family Involvement in Top Mgt x
Family Business Culture
Family Involvement on the Board x
Family Business Culture
Control Variables
Audit Committee (0=No, 1=Yes)
Firm Size (ln)
External Audit (0=No, 1=Yes)
Ownership Dispersion
-2 Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
Cox and Snell R²
Nagelkerke R²
Hit Ratio

267.758
87.861***
.290
.386
76.7%

n = 257, * = p < .05; *** = p < .001
See TABLE 3 for variable definitions
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Additional Sensitivity Tests
Multicollinearity was tested by examining the standard errors for the B
coefficients. No standard errors were larger than 2.0 indicating that multicollinearity was
not an issue (Hair et al. 2010). 1
Common method bias was controlled through the design of the survey tool and
statistical procedures (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003).
Although the measurement of the independent variable (family involvement) and the
dependent variable (the existence of an IAF) were collected from a single respondent, the
measurements were reported as numbers, percentages, and yes/no as opposed to
perceptions. The measurement statements for the moderator variable, the perception
variable, were from established, validated scales. The scales were adapted slightly to
eliminate double-barrelled, vague, or outdated statements and to yield more variability.
The two sets of moderator statements consisted of different scale endpoints to reduce
method bias caused by commonalities in scale endpoints and anchoring effects.
In addition, common method bias was tested as suggested by Podsakoff et al.
(2003). The independent, moderator, and control variables were entered into a factor
analysis. Three factors were extracted with eigenvalues >1.0, which accounted for 59
percent of the variance. The first factor accounted for 30 percent of the variance with the
other variables accounting for 19 and 10 percent, respectively. Common method bias
was not considered to be an issue because the individual factors separated cleanly and no
single factor accounted for the majority of the variance.
1

Logistic regression does not require specific distributions of the independent variables and therefore
heteroscedasticity is not an issue.
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Two additional analyses of the moderator of family business culture were
conducted to further examine the possible influence of the moderator. First, the
independent variables and the moderator were centered before calculating the product
term to test the interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). This analysis did not reveal a
significant influence of family business culture. Second, a dummy variable was created
for family business culture consisting of 0 = low culture and 1 = high culture. An
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine any differences between the
two groups. Once again, family business culture was not found to have a significant
moderating influence.
DISCUSSION
Findings and Implications
The limited, and sometimes contradictory, research on the IAF in family
businesses has left many questions unanswered. Carey et al. (2000) found a positive
association between the separation of ownership and control and the demand for external
audit in medium sized family businesses in Australia. However, the same relationship for
internal auditing was not supported in the Carey et al. (2000) study. This research is the
first step in gaining more knowledge of the antecedents of an IAF in privately held family
businesses and the impact that family involvement in the three critical areas of
ownership, top management and on the board might have on the need for such
accountability systems.
Agency theory suggests that as the gap between the agent and the principal/owner
expands, (i.e., less involvement of the family in this study), the need for monitoring
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systems would increase (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This would result in a negative
relationship between family involvement in ownership, top management, and on the
board of directors and the existence of an IAF. However, this study found no significant
relationship, neither positive nor negative, between family involvement in ownership or
in top management and the existence of an IAF. With regards to family involvement on
the board, a significant relationship was identified, but positive, contrary to the predicted
negative relationship. Perhaps Type II agency problems apply in that as family
involvement on the board increases other owners, either nonfamily owners or minority
family owners, insist on governance mechanisms, such as an IAF.
Thus, while this study does not produce the predicted results, the study adds
interesting information to the ongoing debate of the applicability of agency theory to
family businesses. On one side of the controversy, the significant positive results related
to family involvement on the board is in agreement with Bartholomeusz & Tanewski
(2006) who argue that in the area of corporate governance, family control creates, rather
than negates, agency costs. This result is also interesting because it refers to Type II
agency problems and suggests that an IAF could be a method that privately held family
businesses are utilizing to address this issue. On the other side of the applicability of
agency issues in family businesses, the association between family involvement in
ownership and in top management and the IAF was not statistical significant, indicating
no influence on agency costs with differing levels of family involvement in these areas.
Interestingly, in contrast to research aligning family business decisions with
family control and involvement, this study suggests that the existence of an audit
committee and the existence of an external audit are better predictors of the existence of
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an IAF than family involvement in ownership, in top management, or on the board of
directors.
The study developed the new family business culture construct as a replicable
measure of the influence of the combined cultures of the family and of the business
interacting within family businesses. With an internal reliability score in the excellent
range, the construct provides a new measure to better research family and business
dynamics. One potential explanation for the lack of the new construct to moderate the
relationships in this study might be that business processes are less susceptible to the
influence of culture, dictated instead by best practice decisions. This is one of the first
studies to examine a business process, such as an IAF, in privately held family businesses
in the United States and much remains to be explored in this area.
Limitations and Future Research
A limitation of the study, although managed with survey design and statistical
tests, was the fact of a single respondent from each business. In addition, the respondents
were all in positions of financial responsibility at their business. While this was the
appropriate person to provide the financial and ownership data for the survey, future
research could provide more robust analysis for the family business culture construct by
obtaining multiple responses from the same business at different organizational levels
and in different responsibility areas.
The unexpected results surface some interesting questions related to the power of
the board in privately held family businesses. One aspect influencing the results might be
the fact that the board could be the main decision making body in the business. In that
role, the board represents the ownership group and gives direction to top management,
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therefore dominating the other two independent variables of family involvement. More
information on the interaction between these three groups could provide valuable insights
to decisions involving business processes, controls, and accountability.
The results of this study suggest that family involvement in ownership and in top
management is not a determining factor in the existence of an IAF in a privately held
family business. However, at the board level, family involvement does matter. The
explanatory power of the traditional agency variables used in this study is relatively weak
in these businesses. Additional research should address other potential reasons for the
decision to invest in an IAF. What characteristics of the business or the family have an
impact on that decision? And are there benefits to be gained from investing in the
function, as evidenced in publically traded companies?
In addition, future research is needed to further validate the new family business
culture construct. Family business research in any areas that have the potential to be
influenced by variations in goals, core values, and relationships could benefit from
including the construct in their study. The new construct could provide an additional
measure to assist in gaining more understanding in areas that may have had conflicting
results in the past.
Privately held family businesses, a predominant form of business structure in the
United States and globally, remain a fertile area for research inquiry. This research has
taken the first step of applying agency theory to the area of the IAF in these businesses;
an area not yet researched in the United States.
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CHAPTER 3
INVESTMENT IN INTERNAL AUDITING, FAMILY BUSINESS OUTCOMES, AND
THE MODERATING ROLE OF FAMILY BUSINESS CULTURE

ABSTRACT
Research has indicated that an internal auditing function (IAF) can have a positive
influence on corporate governance and firm performance in publicly traded companies.
However, it remains an open question if similar benefits of an IAF are experienced in
privately held family businesses. Understanding the impact of the investment in an IAF
on family business outcomes can help family businesses to increase economic growth and
sustainability. This research explores the relationship between the investment in an IAF
and the family business outcomes of objective and subjective financial performance, trust
in the business and in top management, and affective commitment. Agency theory is
used to investigate the potential influence of the investment in an IAF on objective and
subjective financial performance measures. Social exchange theory is employed to assess
the potential impact of the IAF on trust and affective commitment. The study also
develops a family business culture construct and investigates the potential moderating
effect of the construct on the analysis. The results do not reveal significant relationships
with the level of dollar investment in an IAF, nor indicate a moderating influence of
family business culture. However, additional analysis does reveal a positive relationship
between the existence of an IAF and objective and subjective performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Internal auditing is defined by the Institute of Internal Auditors as “An
independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and
improve an organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness
of risk management, control, and governance processes” (IIA, 1999). The internal
auditing function (IAF) has been shown to have a positive influence on corporate
governance, reporting quality, and firm performance in publicly traded companies
(Gordon & Smith, 1992; Gramling, Maletta, Schneider, & Church, 2004). The purpose
of this research is to investigate whether there are similar benefits of an IAF in privately
held family businesses.
While the IAF has been studied extensively in the realm of large, publicly traded
firms, relatively little is known about the function and related outcomes among privately
held family businesses. However, family businesses (publicly traded and privately held)
play a leading role in global economic production and employment, totaling 65 to 80
percent of business worldwide (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; IFERA, 2003;
Mandl, 2008). Research in the United States has shown that family businesses generate
approximately 60% of the country’s employment (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003) and
account for 50% of gross domestic product and 78% of new job creation (Perman, 2006).
Anderson & Reeb (2003) found that family ownership was prevalent and
substantial in Standard & Poor’s 500 firms, with family businesses comprising 35% of
the listed companies. In the United States, the majority of research related to family
business performance typically uses archival data from large, publicly traded family
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businesses (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; McConaugby, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001;
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). This has
resulted in a vast section of the U.S. economy, primarily comprised of privately held
family businesses, remaining unexplored.
While the possible outcome variables that could be measured are numerous, for
the purposes of this study, three family business outcomes were measured and examined:
(1) financial performance (objective and subjective), (2) trust (in the business and in top
management), and (3) affective commitment.
Privately held family businesses provide a new context in which to investigate the
impact of a form of governance mechanism, an IAF, on firm performance. Debicki,
Matherne, Kellermanns, & Chrisman (2009) analyzed 291 family business research
articles published in 30 management journals during the period of 2001 to 2007. One of
the three main gaps identified in the Debicki et al. (2009) research was the impact of
governance of the family, and of the firm, on family business performance. Basco &
Rodriquez (2009) suggest that the research on family business performance will improve
when equal attention is given to the governance of both the family and the business.
Following this suggestion, the present research addresses both domains by measuring the
influence of an IAF on family business outcomes, moderated by family business culture.
Prior research has acknowledged that privately held family businesses employ
measures of performance that may be different from traditional financial measures.
Family independence and employment (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Kuratko,
Hornsby, & Naffziger, 1997), family reputation (Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; GomezMajia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), family satisfaction
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(Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997), and family activities and products are often
valued at least as much as, if not more than, profits, return on assets or other financial
results (Astrachan, 2010; Chua, Chrisman, & Steier, 2003). When family business
outcomes fail to meet the family’s goals, the family members’ motivation to continue the
investment and involvement in the business may be reduced (Kuratko et al. 1997).
Therefore, understanding the relationship of variables, such as an IAF, with family
business outcomes could help family business managers prolong the life of their business
and increase economic growth and sustainability (Aronoff & Ward, 1991).
Research on family business performance has produced ambiguous results. Some
studies have found that strong personal ties and close identification with the family create
an element of responsiveness to environmental shifts (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003;
Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008) that may result in improved firm
performance. Denison, Lief, & Ward (2004) indicated that family businesses have
distinct performance-enhancing cultures. However, other studies have indicated an array
of detrimental effects of family influence such as expropriation of wealth from minority
shareholders (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a),
lack of professionalism (Hall & Nordqvist, 2008), non-reciprocal altruism (Schulze,
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), shirking (Dyer,
2006; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Schulze et al. 2001), excessive
concern with wealth preservation (Carney, 2005), entrenchment (Burkart et al. 2003), and
adverse selection (Dyer, 2006), all of which may decrease firm performance.
One potential reason for the conflicting results could be diverse definitions of
family businesses and problems inherent in measuring family business performance
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(Astrachan, 2010; Holt, Rutherford, & Kuratko, 2010; Sharma, 2004). Another potential
reason could be the moderating effect of the unique and dynamic culture of the family, a
variable often overlooked in empirical research (Dyer, 2003, 2006; Vallejo, 2011).
Family businesses are in the unique and complex situation of combining the culture of the
family with the culture of the organization. Family culture exerts powerful influences
over what family business members do and how they interpret and respond to
environmental challenges (Zahra et al. 2008). Therefore, researchers have suggested
including the culture of the family as a variable in future studies (Dyer, 2003, 2006;
Vallejo, 2011). Following this suggestion, this research combines the culture of the
family with the culture of the organization to form a single, comprehensive measure of
culture, referred to as “family business culture”. Family business culture enables an
analysis of the impact of differing levels of culture on the relationship between an IAF
and three specific family business outcomes.
While gaining knowledge of the impact of an IAF on financial performance is
important, trust and affective commitment are also key outcomes in a family business.
Scholars across time and disciplines agree that trust is highly beneficial to the functioning
of organizations (see Dirks & Ferrin (2001) for a summary). Trust results in more
positive attitudes, higher levels of workplace behavior, and superior levels of
performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). In addition, trust serves as a lens to interpret
behaviors and serves as a basis for a person’s decision regarding whether, and how to,
interact with others (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009). Research suggests that family
businesses may be unique in their ability to capitalize on trust (Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, &
Becerra, 2010; Steier, 2001; Sundaramurthy, 2008). Hence, trust is a construct of
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particular relevance in family businesses (Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, & Chua, 2010)
and is therefore an outcome measure in this study. The decision to implement and
maintain an IAF could have been made by top management or by the organization.
Therefore, trust in top management and trust in the organization will be measured to
evaluate if the investment in an IAF influences trust at either of these two levels.
Individuals with high levels of affective commitment have a strong alignment
with the organization’s goals (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Sharma & Irving, 2005). High
levels of affective commitment can result in behaviors that go above and beyond the call
of duty to the business (Sharma & Irving, 2005; Shore & Wayne, 1993; Van Dyne,
Graham, & Dienesch, 1994). These discretionary behaviors have been found to be
critical for effective organizational functioning and firm performance (Van Dyne et al.
1994). The existence of high levels of commitment is frequently regarded as one of the
advantages of family businesses compared to nonfamily businesses (Poutziouris, 2001;
Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). In addition, Vallejo (2009) found that the affective commitment
dimension in family businesses had the strongest positive effect on the level of
identification of nonfamily employees. These findings indicate that affective
commitment is a key dimension influencing efforts toward the profitability and continuity
of the family business.
In summary, high levels of trust and affective commitment can enhance
organizational responsiveness to the identification and rapid exploitation of profitable
opportunities, possibly leading to a source of competitive advantage and sustainability of
the business (Huff & Kelley, 2003; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004; Zahra et al. 2008).
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Therefore, it is important to research managerial actions, such as the investment in an
IAF, that might foster or damage trust and affective commitment.
An integration of two theories provides the theoretical foundation for this study.
Consistent with prior research related to an IAF, agency theory is used to examine the
relationship between the investment in a governance mechanism, an IAF, and financial
performance. Adams (1994) stated that agency theory can help explain the existence,
role and responsibilities of an IAF. Agency theory suggests that the IAF, in conjunction
with other mechanisms like financial reporting and external auditing, helps to maintain
cost-efficient contracting between owners and managers (Sherer & Kent, 1983). In
addition, Sherer & Kent (1983) argue that the information provided by the IAF to
management provides the opportunity to remedy weaknesses in procedures before they
have a significant effect on the overall financial condition of the organization. Cost
savings can be achieved as a result of the internal auditor’s specific industry and business
knowledge, increasing the bottom line.
The second theory, social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), with its basis in the norm
of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), has long been utilized by organizational researchers to
examine the motivation for employee behaviors and formation of employee attitudes
(Levinson, 1965; March & Simon, 1958). Social exchange theory is among the most
influential concepts for understanding workplace behavior (Cropanzano & Mitchell,
2005; Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996). However, the theory has rarely been used in the
context of an IAF.
Social exchange theory suggests that trust and organizational commitment reflect
an individual’s perceptions about the exchange and reciprocal nature of the relationship
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that exists between the organization and themselves. In other words, individuals’
perceptions of an IAF may affect their levels of trust (Coletti, Sedatole, & Towry, 2005;
Das & Bing-Sheng, 1998; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) and organizational commitment
(Angle & Perry, 1981; Buchanan, 1974; Heinsman, de Hoogh, Koopman, & van Muijen,
2006). An entity devoted to assessing internal control, such as an IAF, can establish
expectations and reliability, leading to predictability and an environment conducive to a
beneficial exchange between employees and the business. When employees perceive that
the IAF is a tool to support their efforts, they may reciprocate with increased levels of
trust and affective organizational commitment.
Social exchange theory is particularly applicable to the family business
environment, as social exchange relationships are characterized by a long-term
orientation (Emerson, 1976), which is commonly found in some family businesses (Le
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). This relates to the exchange of both tangible and
intangible resources, including trust and commitment (Emerson, 1981). In addition,
extant literature indicates that attitudes and values of family members, particularly
commitment to the business, can be beneficial contributors to family business outcomes
and performance (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008).
This research expands family business research in several areas. First, measuring
financial and nonfinancial aspects of performance allows the inclusion of idiosyncratic
goals of the owning family (Astrachan, 2010). Second, this study provides knowledge
related to the impact of an IAF on various outcomes across family businesses. Finally,
organizational culture is combined with family culture to form a single construct referred
to as family business culture. This variable is utilized as a moderator of the strength of
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the relationship between the investment in an IAF and family business outcomes. This
approach enables an analysis across family businesses, as opposed to the majority of
extant research that has dichotomously compared family businesses to nonfamily
businesses (Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005).
Several questions are critical to explore. Is the investment in an IAF associated
with family business outcomes, and if so, which outcomes? Does family business culture
influence the relationship between investment in an IAF and family business outcomes?
Is the influence different for financial and nonfinancial outcomes? The purpose of this
study is to provide answers to these questions and address the identified gaps in the
literature related to the IAF in privately held family businesses. This knowledge can be
used to determine to what extent an IAF is, or would be, a beneficial governance
mechanism in privately held family businesses.
The remainder of the paper consists of three sections. The following section
provides the theoretical background and introduces the hypotheses to be tested. The
subsequent section explains the sample selection, data collection, and the analytical
methods utilized. The final section discusses the implications of the research, identifies
limitations and makes suggestions for future research.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The Internal Auditing Function (IAF) in Privately Held Family Businesses
The IAF is one of the internal controls acknowledged by the internationally
recognized Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO, 1992). Internal controls are
structures, activities, processes, and systems which assist management in effectively
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mitigating risks to an organization’s achievement of its objectives (IIA, 1999). Internal
controls, such as systems of monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding, are used to mitigate
risks by changing the incentives for opportunistic behavior (Coletti et al. 2005; Seal,
Cullen, Dunlop, Berry, & Ahmed, 1999). Over the last decade the role of the IAF has
increased in prominence.
The Institute of Internal Auditors (2010) states that the IAF can serve “as an
organization’s safety net for compliance with rules, regulations, and overall best
practices.” Knowledge of a company’s culture, operations, and risk profile is essential to
company success and longevity (IIA, 2010). The primary role of an IAF is to provide
this crucial information to an organization and its oversight entities and therefore serve as
a valuable resource for the business (IIA, 2010).
Despite the recent attention and benefits of an IAF, research on the relationship
between an IAF and business outcomes is limited (Debicki et al. 2009; Trotman &
Trotman, 2010). The majority of prior research has focused on the quality of the IAF, the
decision making processes of the internal auditor, or the relationships between the
internal auditor and other stakeholders (Gramling et al. 2004). Other research has
examined factors associated with the existence (Carey, Simnett, & Tanewski, 2000), size
(Anderson, Christ, Johnston, & Rittenberg, 2012; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006) and
budget (Barua, Rama, & Sharma, 2010; Carcello, Hermanson, & Raghunandan, 2005) of
an IAF.
However, research examining the relationship of an IAF to business outcomes is
scarce, particularly in the context of family businesses (Carey et al. 2000; Debicki et al.
2009; Trotman & Trotman, 2010). This paucity has resulted in a vast section of the
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economy, comprised primarily of privately held family businesses, remaining
unexplored. The importance of examining the relationship between a governance
mechanism, such as an IAF, and family business outcomes has the potential of providing
information concerning influences on economic growth and sustainability of the business.
Questions arise as to what effects such governance mechanisms will have on desired
employee behaviors such as motivation to participate and perform (Frankema &
Koopman, 2004; Garrety, 2008; March & Simon, 1958) and, ultimately, family business
outcomes. Therefore, a better understanding of governance mechanisms, such as IAF,
that could potentially impact family business outcomes is critical.
Family Business Outcomes
Financial Performance Measures and the IAF
From a theoretical perspective, agency theory has provided the framework for
most of the prior research related to a firm’s utilization of an IAF (Adams, 1994; Carcello
et al. 2005; Carey et al. 2000; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006; Wallace & Kreutzfeldt,
1991). In their seminal article, Jensen & Meckling (1976) posited that agency costs do
not apply when a wholly owned firm is managed by the owner because the owner will
make decisions that maximize the utility of the business and the owner.
Other researchers, however, have suggested that family control actually creates
situations of agency costs rather than negating them. Expropriation of wealth from
minority shareholders (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Schulze et al. 2003a), nonreciprocal altruism (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b), adverse selection (Dyer, 2006),
entrenchment (Burkart et al. 2003), and shirking (Dyer, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001;
Schulze et al. 2001) are some of the key agency issues that can arise in family businesses.
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In other words, family involvement in the business has the potential to increase or
decrease financial performance due to agency costs (Chrisman et al. 2004).
In researching family business financial performance, Bartholomeusz & Tanewski
(2006) compared family businesses to nonfamily businesses listed on the Australian
Stock Exchange. The researchers found that in order to improve financial firm
performance and maximize firm value, family owners needed to adopt more transparent
corporate governance structures and be subject to a greater discipline of independent
monitoring. In research of a sample of 1,376 privately held U.S. family businesses,
Schulze et al. (2001) found family businesses that utilized internal control mechanisms
similar to those of widely held firms (e.g., strategic planning and pay incentives),
performed significantly better financially than those family businesses without such
controls. The authors concluded that it is essential that family businesses invest in
internal controls that are deemed necessary for widely held firms.
One role of an IAF is to examine past events with the intention of improving
future performance (Penini & Carmeli, 2009). Extant research in publicly traded
businesses has suggested that an IAF can have a positive influence in many areas
including firm performance (Gordon & Smith, 1992; Gramling et al. 2004). Penini &
Carmeli (2009) state that audit results can be the basis for adjusting policies, priorities,
structures and processes, and creating more effective and cost-beneficial activities.
Based on the extant literature related to the benefits of an IAF to publicly traded
businesses, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H1a: The investment in an IAF will be positively related to objective
financial performance measures in privately held family businesses
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H1b: The investment in an IAF will be positively related to subjective
financial performance measures in privately held family businesses
Nonfinancial Performance Measures and the IAF
Performance, broadly defined, relates to efficiencies in utilizing resources as well
as the accomplishment of organizational goals (Steers, 1976). Performance in family
businesses is multi-faceted, as these businesses have goals that are both financial and
nonfinancial (Astrachan, 2010; Astrachan & Zellweger, 2008; Basco & Rodriquez, 2009;
Chua et al. 2003; Hienerth & Kessler, 2006). Some past family business research may
have inaccurately defined performance as primarily related to financial profits (Westhead
& Cowling, 1997).
However, families have a devotion and passion for the business that stems more
from substantive missions and values than any desire for quick profits (Miller & Le
Breton-Miller, 2003). Stafford, Duncan, Dane, & Winter (1999) observed that family
businesses have the opportunity to define success on their own terms, and often look
beyond profitability to goals such as the ability to live and operate the business according
to personal values or to pass the business to the next generation. For example, family
independence and satisfaction (Chrisman et al. 2004; Kuratko et al. 1997; Sorenson,
1999), pursuit of market opportunities based upon family values, and respect in the
community (Eddleston et al. 2008; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008;
Sorenson, 1999) are possible goals resulting from a unique family culture.
The theory of social exchange (Blau, 1964), with its basis in the norm of
reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), has long been utilized by organizational researchers to
examine the motivation for employee behaviors and formation of employee attitudes
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(Levinson, 1965; March & Simon, 1958). Social exchange theory is among the most
influential concepts for understanding workplace behavior (Cropanzano & Mitchell,
2005). One of the basic tenets of social exchange theory is that parties abide by certain
rules or interactions of exchange (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). These interactions are
usually seen as interdependent and contingent on the actions of another person (Blau,
1964).
Social exchange theory suggests there is an expectation of an unspecified future
return, which is based on an individual trusting that the other parties to the exchange will
discharge their obligations fairly in the long run (Blau, 1968). Blau (1964) argues that
unlike economic exchange, social exchange tends to engender feelings of personal
obligations, gratitude, and trust that cannot be obtained by bargaining. These feelings
equate to a sign of mutual support and investment in the relationship. Social exchange
occurs within structures of mutual dependence whereby individuals and the organization
are dependent upon each other for valued outcomes (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson,
2000).
Trust
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer (1998, p. 395) define trust as “a
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” Trust, as a social
construct, is a critical element at the center of relationships, influencing each
party’s behavior toward the other (Blau, 1968; Deutschi, 1960; Neves & Caetano,
2006). Extant literature has recognized trust as an identifiable outcome of
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favorable social exchanges (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Neves &
Caetano, 2006).
Trust is not only a quality of individuals, but it is also a function of the
qualities of the relationship between employees and firms and the institutional
context in which those relationships are incorporated (Shapiro, 1987; Zucker,
1986). Businesses are challenged as they attempt to identify beneficial levels of
internal controls, such as an IAF, while simultaneously considering the impact of
the governance mechanism on trust (Coletti et al. 2005). However, trust has not
been fully integrated into the governance literature, which has primarily focused
on agency theory to explain behavior and controls in firms (Bijlsma & Koopman,
2003).
Organizational scholars have posited that control (Arrow, 1974; Ouchi, 1980) is
built on a foundation of trust. Controls are seen as a “process by which the elements of a
system are made more predictable through the establishment of standards in the pursuit of
some desired objective or state” (Leifer & Mills, 1996, p. 117). A great amount of
disagreement exists in the research that has been conducted on the relationship between
controls and trust (Bijlsma & Koopman, 2003; Das & Bing-Sheng, 1998). Controls have
been interpreted as implying that one party does not trust the other (Das & Bing-Sheng,
1998), resulting in decision makers perceiving other collaborators as less trustworthy
(Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). In addition, control oriented management may overlook
the impact of employees’ perception of trust on the resulting employee behaviors (Davis,
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Kelman, 1958).
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In contrast, other studies have found that a strong control system enhances the
level of trust in collaborative situations (Coletti et al. 2005; Cruz et al. 2010). If used
properly, internal controls may help to build trust (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005;
Goold & Campbell, 1987) and predict or produce trust (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998;
Sitkin & George, 2005). The discussion in support of the trust building benefits of
internal controls is that they establish expectations, predictability, a track record, and an
objective evaluation process (Das & Bing-Sheng, 1998; Goold & Campbell, 1987;
Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). This creates an environment that is conducive to nurturing
and strengthening trust (Das & Bing-Sheng, 1998). Sitkin & Roth (1993) further suggest
that internal controls can promote trust through reliability in several ways. Fostering
coordination, ensuring that employees are treated uniformly and their rights are protected,
and minimizing resentment and concern are several ways of promoting trust through
reliability (Sitkin & Roth, 1993).
While the majority of extant research has focused on various types of internal
controls and governance mechanisms, and not specifically an IAF, it is anticipated that
the relationships would also hold for this type of internal control. In summary, prior
research leads to the following hypotheses:
H2a: The investment in an IAF is positively related to trust in the business
in privately held family businesses.
Existing literature on trust in organizations suggests that managers who
invoke and draw attention to their appropriate use of a variety of controls can
engender greater trust (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001, Rousseau et al. 1998). Sitkin &
George (2005) indicated that when there are perceived threats to trust in
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management, the consistent use of formal controls and reduced use of informal
controls produced better results at maintaining the trust. Bijlsma-Frankema &
Costa, 2005 argue that subordinates’ trust in management is positively related to
monitoring their performance, indicating that trust and control are positively
related, and leading to the following hypothesis:
H2b: The investment in an IAF is positively related to trust in top
management in privately held family businesses
Affective Commitment to an Organization
Organizational commitment is defined as “the strength of an individual’s
identification with and involvement in a particular organization” (Porter, Steers,
Mowday, & Boulian, 1974, p. 604). The authors state that such commitment can
generally be characterized by the following factors: “(a) a strong belief in and acceptance
of the organization’s goals and values; (b) a willingness to exert considerable effort on
behalf of the organization; and (c) a definite desire to maintain organizational
membership” (Porter et al. 1974, p. 604). Social exchange theory has provided a
framework to study organizational commitment (Blau, 1964; Masterson, Lewis,
Goldman, & Taylor, 2000). Social exchange theorists have proposed that employees are
prone to exchange their commitment for an employer’s support (Eisenberger, Fasolo, &
Davis-LaMastro, 1990).
Settoon et al. (1996) examined the relative contribution of different exchange
relationships to important employee outcome variables. Organizational commitment was
selected as one of the dependent variables in the Settoon et al. (1996) research for several
reasons. First, empirical research has found organizational commitment to be associated
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with actions on the part of the organization and its representatives that seemingly demand
reciprocity. Second, reciprocity, the basis for social exchange, is a mechanism
underlying commitment. Finally, employees have been found to view organizational
commitment as an acceptable commodity for exchange.
Research examining the relationship between internal controls and organizational
commitment is scarce (Argyris, 1985; Koopman, 1991). Internal controls can help
synchronize tasks, limit variance in individual behaviors, and increase predictability.
However, the perception of limiting the autonomy of the individual may have an
unfavorable effect on his or her commitment to the organization (Koopman, 1991).
Increasing controls by adding more rules and procedures, can increase the tension
between control and commitment and may be answered with creative opposition from
employees (Argyris, 1985; Koopman, 1991).
Research in the fields of sociology (Etzioni, 1965) and social psychology
(Kelman, 1958) has observed that various forms of evaluations and controls can result in
differing individual levels of commitment to, or alienation from, the organization and its
objectives. At one extreme, an internal control that depends heavily on monitoring,
evaluating, and correcting in an explicit manner is likely to offend an individual’s sense
of autonomy and self-control. This could result in an unenthusiastic, purely compliant
response (Argyris, 1957; Ouchi, 1979). At the other extreme, Ouchi (1979) emphasizes
the crucial task of having the right individuals in place. When individuals share the
values and goals of the organization, higher levels of commitment can be the result.
Social exchange theory proposes that repeated, positive exchanges over time
reduce uncertainty and produce commitment. The long-term orientation of family
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businesses (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006) is especially conducive to favorable
reciprocal exchanges. These favorable exchanges can produce better working
relationships and permit individuals to be more committed to, and trusting of, one another
(Blau, 1964; Molm et al. 2000).
Allen & Meyer (1990) identified a model consisting of three distinct dimensions
of organizational commitment; affective commitment, continuance commitment, and
normative commitment. The Allen & Meyer (1990) model has become the dominant
model for the study of workplace commitment in empirical research (Fu, Bolander, &
Jones, 2009; S. Jaros, 2007; Sharma & Irving, 2005).
More specifically, affective commitment has been the most prevalent approach to
measuring organizational commitment (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001).
In extant family business literature the typical usage of the term commitment is consistent
with the definition of affective commitment (Sharma & Irving, 2005). Vallejo (2009)
found that of the three dimensions of the Allen & Meyer (1990) model, the affective
dimension had the strongest positive effect on the level of identification of nonfamily
employees in family businesses. For these reasons, affective commitment is the
dimension of organizational commitment utilized for this study.
Affective commitment is the attachment an individual has to an organization
based upon identification with the organization and agreement with the goals and values
of the organization (Allen & Meyer, 1990). This attachment describes an employee’s
bond to the organization which includes emotional feelings such as belongingness and
loyalty (Jaros, Jermier, Koehler, & Sincich, 1993). Affective commitment is
demonstrative of “wanting to be here” behavior related to organizational commitment
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decisions, such as to remain with the organization and to participate (Allen & Meyer,
1990; March & Simon, 1958). An individual with high levels of affective commitment
has a strong alignment with the organization’s goals (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Sharma &
Irving, 2005). This commitment leads to the belief that the individual feels that his or her
career aspirations can be satisfied in the context of the organization (Sharma & Irving,
2005).
Zahra et al. (2008) offer several reasons why a strong commitment to the
business, on the part of employees who are family business members, can create a similar
affective response among other nonfamily employees. First, experimental research has
shown that affect and motivation are contagious within a group, influencing outcomes
such as cooperation and performance (Barsade, 2002). Second, the importance of the
affective commitment and the resulting “tone” of the leader has an important effect on
subsequent coordination and efforts on behalf of the followers (Sy, Cote, & Saavedra,
2005). Lastly, research on employee-organization relationships proposes that the
strongest influencers of employee affect are the organization’s leaders (Rhoades &
Eisenberger, 2002), i.e., in family businesses, the founders and owners (Zahra et al.
2008).
Zahra et al. (2008, p. 1038) conclude that “overall these results support the social
contagion of affect: when one member of a group experiences and behaves in a
committed fashion, it increases the probability that other group members will also
experience identity and commitment to the organization.” The relationship of individuals
with high levels of affective commitment to the business is perceived as being based on
open-ended, long-term exchanges rather than a transactional contract (Morrison, 1994).
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Family businesses in particular are characterized by long-term relationships and
employee loyalty, which are conducive to building affective commitment (Miller & Le
Breton-Miller, 2006; Vallejo, 2008). Based on these findings, the following hypothesis
can be formulated:
H3: The investment in an IAF is positively related to the measure of
affective commitment in privately held family businesses
Family Business Culture as a Moderating Construct
Kotter & Heskett (1992) suggest that culture refers to values (what is considered
important) that are shared by members of a group and tend to persist overtime, even when
the members of the group change. Family businesses are in a unique situation of
combining the culture of the family with the culture of the organization. For this study,
organizational culture (the culture of the business) is combined with family culture, to
form a new construct referred to as family business culture. Prior to discussing the
relevance of this newly created construct in the context of an IAF, each of the two
constituting components are addressed separately in the following sections.
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture has been defined in numerous ways. However, a common
theme is that it refers to a system of shared meaning held by organizational members that
distinguishes the organization from all other organizations (Becker, 1982). It may be
viewed as “the pattern of shared values and beliefs that help individuals understand the
organizational functioning and thus provide them with the norms for behavior in the
organization” (Deshpande & Webster, 1989, p. 4). The importance of values in
organizational culture is fundamentally linked to the process of identity formation in
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which individuals seek a social connection and use this identification to define
themselves (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).
Past research has found that one key element of organizational culture is the
person-organization fit, in which aspects of both the individual and the situation combine
to influence an individual’s response to a given situation (O'Reilly, Chatman, &
Caldwell, 1991). When people belong to the same organization and share perceptions
about beliefs and values, they tend to act in similar ways (Sorensen, 2002). For example,
characteristics of organizational culture, such as innovation and risk-taking, attention to
detail, team orientation, stability, and outcome orientation, strongly influence employee
behaviors (Chatman & Jehn, 1994; O'Reilly et al. 1991).
Strong organizational cultures exist when employees and management respond to
situations because of their alignment with organizational values. However, the strength
of organizational cultures being positively related to organizational performance has
yielded mixed results (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Lee & Yu, 2004; Nemeth, 1997;
Sorensen, 2002). Nemeth (1997) suggests that an unanticipated consequence of strong
organizational culture companies is the stifling of employee creativity and innovation
through an intense commitment to a set of ideas, a form of groupthink (Janis, 1972,
1982). In addition, strong culture firms tend to excel at incremental change levels, but
encounter difficulties in more volatile environments (Lee & Yu, 2004; Sorensen, 2002).
On the other hand, strong organizational cultures can positively affect
performance by instilling within employees a clear sense of purpose and expectations that
can result in increased organizational commitment (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). This
outcome could be the case because a strong organizational culture reduces variability in
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performance, promotes a high level of commitment to an established way of
understanding the world, and avoids the costs of disagreement surrounding organizational
goals and the means to achieve them (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Sorensen, 2002). Peters &
Waterman (1982) found that the stronger the culture the less the need for policy manuals,
organizational charts, or detailed procedures and rules. “In these companies, people way
down the line know what they are supposed to do in most situations because the handful
of guiding values is crystal clear” (Peters & Waterman, 1982, pp. 75-76).
Family Culture
Families vary greatly in their nature, composition, beliefs, and orientations,
resulting in widely varying family cultures. Family cultures exert powerful influences
over what family business members do and how they interpret and respond to
environmental challenges (Zahra et al. 2008) and serve as the foundation for the culture
of the family business (Heck, 2004). Dyer (1988) indicates that the culture found on the
business side of the family business plays an important role in whether the firm continues
beyond the first generation. In addition, family culture has been empirically proven to
have a significant influence on key strategic decisions of the family business, i.e.,
promoting entrepreneurship and enhancing the distinctiveness of the firm’s products,
goods, and services (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004).
Vallejo (2008) conducted a comparative analysis of the culture of family
businesses and nonfamily businesses in the automobile distributor sector in Spain. The
research results implied that family businesses have a stronger culture based on the fact
that they have greater organizational commitment, greater organizational harmony, and a
more long-term oriented management. Families with strong personal ties and identifying
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more closely with the family business create an environment enabling the firm to react
faster to environmental shifts (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Zahra et al. 2008).
Family Business Culture and the IAF
Prior research has suggested that family businesses perform better because of
who they are (Denison et al. 2004). Results have indicated that family businesses have a
distinct performance enhancing culture (Denison et al. 2004). “The literature shows
consistently that family businesses are more value or culture driven, more concerned with
indoctrination, more apt to be caring of and loyal to their employees, and more
preoccupied with getting the full potential out of their staff” (Miller & Le Breton-Miller,
2003, p. 130). Miller & Le Breton-Miller (2003) continue by suggesting that being
driven by values or culture helps establish a virtuous circle where employees sense they
are in a reciprocal, encompassing relationship with the business. This is an environment
conducive to positive, long-term exchanges.
Research has not been conducted to determine how levels of family culture would
impact the relationship between a governance mechanism, such as an IAF, and financial
and nonfinancial outcomes. However, as the family grows, matures, and experiences
possible leadership changes, the need for a governance mechanism, such as an IAF, may
develop. Employees could perceive the IAF as a method of management providing
support, reliability, consistency, and known expectations for them in performing their
responsibilities. The result could be a positive exchange and either no influence or a
positive influence on family business outcomes (Coletti et al. 2005). On the other hand,
if the employees perceive the IAF as a method of monitoring their work, the control
system can have detrimental effects on outcomes. The governance mechanism could
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undermine the sense of value congruence, and threaten the monitored individual’s sense
of competence and autonomy (Sitkin & George, 2005).
Family business literature argues that the secret of family business can be the
family culture of the business, which opens communication, streamlines decision making,
and creates a context of strong, understood norms and values (Chua et al. 2003;
Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Hoopes & Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller,
2006). The above research results relating to the uniqueness and importance of family
business culture leads to the potential that family business culture will moderate the
proposed relationships as follows:
H4a: Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between
the investment in an IAF and the objective financial performance of
privately held family businesses, such that the positive relationship will
weaken as the level of family business culture increases
H4b: Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between
the investment in an IAF and the subjective financial performance of
privately held family businesses, such that the positive relationship will
weaken as the level of family business culture increases
H5a: Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between
the investment in an IAF and trust in the business at privately held
family businesses, such that the positive relationship will weaken as the
level of family business culture increases
H5b: Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between
the investment in an IAF and trust in top management at privately held
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family businesses, such that the positive relationship will weaken as the
level of family business culture increases
H6:

Family business culture will moderate the positive relationship between
the investment in an IAF and affective commitment at privately held
family businesses, such that the positive relationship will weaken as the
level of family business culture increases

The conceptual model operationalized is presented in Figure 1.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data Collection
Data were collected for this research via an electronic survey. The use of surveys
to gather primary data is consistent with other empirical studies investigating family
businesses (e.g. Chrisman, Gatewood, & Donlevy, 2002; Eddleston et al. 2008; Schulze
et al. 2003a). A pretest of the survey was conducted using family business members of a
family business center in the southeastern region of the United States. The pretest was
used to verify the appropriateness and clarity of the approach and questions contained in
the survey (Hair, Money, Samouel, & page, 2007). In addition, the pretest was used to
determine the appropriate scales for responses based on respondents’ feedback. The
electronic survey was completed by the Chief Financial Officer or an individual in an
equivalent position in a privately held family business that could provide financial and
business structure information.
Privately held family businesses do not have any public disclosure requirements
resulting in the need to collect primary data for the research because of the lack of
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FIGURE 1
Conceptual Model Operationalized

Family Business Culture
Second-Order Factor Analysis
a) F-PEC Culture Subscale (15 Items)
b) Denison Organizational Culture Survey (11 Items)
-H4a, -H4b, -H5a, -H5b, -H6

+H1a

Objective Financial
Performance (3 Items)
+H1b

Subjective Financial
Performance (7 Items)
Investment in the Internal
Auditing Function
Percentage of expenditures for the
IAF compared to total operating
expenditures for the last fiscal year

+H2a

Trust in Top Mgt (ShockleyZalabak – 6 Items)

+H2b

Trust in Business (Huff &
Kelley – 4 Items)
+H3

Affective Commitment
(Meyer & Allen – 4 Items)

Control Variables: Firm size, firm age, age of the IAF, education level of the respondent and
prior work experience with an IAF
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secondary or archival data. Gathering data from these businesses remains extremely
challenging due to the importance they place on maintaining their privacy and
confidentiality (Handler, 1989). A private research company was determined to be the
best method of obtaining responses. Qualtrics (Clear Voice Research) is a market
research company with census representation to reach hard to source groups. This
company and their panel respondents have been used in prior academic research (e.g.,
Strauss, Griffin, & Parker, in press).
Qualtrics has approximately 540,000 panelists who respond at an average rate of
20%. In studies like this one, where the respondent pool was a hard-to-reach segment,
the company employs partnerships with other companies to obtain the responses. In
addition, several checks are in place to confirm the identity of the respondents.
Verification of postal addresses, flash cookies, and internet protocol (IP) addresses are
utilized to identify respondents. The company pulls samples in quota group formats.
Then simple randomization is used to give a representative sample of new and old
members within the groups. Respondents are limited to one completed survey every 10
days with the research company maintaining full records on panelist activity.
Respondents receive a cash value reward based on the length of the survey and the target
audience requested. The reward is credited to their member account and is available to
be redeemed in debit cards or gift certificates once his/her account exceeds $10.00.
Respondents were asked if their business is privately held or publicly traded. For
the privately held businesses an analysis was conducted of their responses to the
questions related to owning family involvement in ownership, in top management, and on
the board to verify that the business was a family business. After screening the data for
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missing and invalid responses, a sample of 257 respondents was obtained. The surveys
were anonymous in the data received from the research company with no information
linking to the identification of the business or the respondent.
Demographics
Table 1 displays the demographics for the 257 respondents. The majority of
respondents were members of the owning family and have education beyond that of high
school and technical college. Approximately one half of the businesses (122 of 257)
have an IAF with the average age of the IAF being 4.44 years. Forty-one of the
respondents did not have any experience working with a business with an IAF.
Additional demographics for all the respondents are presented in Table 1.
Dependent Variables
Family Business Outcomes – Financial Performance
Consistent with extant family business literature, financial performance was
measured using both objective and subjective measures (e.g., Daily & Dollinger, 1992;
Lindow, Stubner, & Wulf, 2010; Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008). Obtaining at least
two measures is preferred for several reasons. First, it is difficult to accurately interpret
financial performance for privately held family businesses due to potential owner and
industry specific factors (Westhead & Howorth, 2006). Second, information must be
obtained directly from family businesses, which are known to be hesitant to release
objective performance figures (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Love, Priem, &
Lumpkin, 2002). Finally, privately held family businesses often have short-term and
long-term objectives that would be difficult to recognize with purely objective financial
measures
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TABLE 1
Demographics
Panel A – Respondent Demographics

With IAF
(n = 122)

Without IAF Total
(n = 135) (n = 257)

Gender

Male
Female

80
42

65
70

145
112

Family Member

Yes
No

92
30

115
20

207
50

Age (In years)

Under 30
30 – 39
40 – 49
50 – 59
60 and Over

0
45
38
24
15

11
27
32
34
31

11
72
70
58
16

Highest Education

High School
Technical College
College Degree
Advanced Degree

6
9
71
36

21
17
80
17

27
26
151
53

CPA

Yes
No

41
81

20
115

61
196

Number of Years with the
Business

< 5
5 – 10
11 – 15
> 16

15
49
28
30

31
40
28
36

46
89
56
66

Number of Years
experience with
an IAF (In years)

None
1 – 10
11 – 20
21 – 30
> 30

0
63
39
15
5

41
39
34
17
4

41
102
73
32
9
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Demographics
Panel B - Business Demographics

With IAF
(n = 122)

Without IAF Total
(n = 135) (n = 257)

Industry

Retail
Services
Manufacturing
Wholesale
Construction
Other

18
44
19
11
14
16

25
46
18
7
12
27

43
90
37
18
26
43

Age of the Internal
Auditing Function
(In years)

< 5
5–9
> 9

37
38
47

External Audit - Performed
by:

International Firm
National Firm
Regional Firm
Local Firm
No External Audit

22
24
13
22
41

9
11
6
12
97

31
35
19
34
119

Audit Committee

Yes
No

57
65

12
123

69
188

37
38
47
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(Geringer & Herbert, 1991) and may not reflect the achievement of the noneconomic
goals of the business (Astrachan, 2010).
The objective financial performance measures of return on assets (ROA), return
on equity (ROE) and return on sales (ROS) for the last fiscal year were used to measure
objective financial performance. These measures are among the most widely used
financial performance measures for unlisted family businesses (Zellweger & Nason,
2008). The respondents were asked to select the appropriate range on a scale of 1 to 12
with anchors between > - 50% and > 50%.
Subjective financial performance was assessed through seven performance related
questions regarding sales, market share, net income, return on equity, return on assets, the
ability to fund growth, and overall performance (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). For
each of the seven items, respondents indicated on a 100-point sliding scale anchored by 0
(Very dissatisfied) and 100 (Very satisfied) their satisfaction with their business’s
performance for the last fiscal year. Past research has shown that this method correlates
with objective financial performance data (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990; Eddleston &
Kellermanns, 2007; Love et al. 2002; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).
The three objective financial indicators and the seven subjective financial
indicators were totaled in their separate groups to form two overall financial performance
scores with higher values equating to higher performance (Dess et al. 1990; Eddleston &
Kellermanns, 2007).
Family Business Outcomes – Trust
Trust was measured at two levels, trust in the business and trust in top
management. Those are the anticipated levels at which the decision to implement and
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support an IAF is likely made. Therefore, the decision to invest in an IAF will likely
affect the trust in individuals at these levels. Trust was measured with two established
and validated scales from prior research (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006). Overall trust in the
business was measured utilizing four statements from Huff & Kelley (2003). A sevenpoint Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (Strongly disagree) and 7 (Strongly agree) asked
respondents to indicate the extent to which they disagreed or agreed with the four
statements. Cronbach’s alpha for research conducted in the United States with these four
statements was .83 (Huff & Kelley, 2003).
Trust in top management used six statements adapted from Shockley-Zalabak,
Ellis, & Winograd (2000). While the original survey instrument used a five-point scale,
respondents in this study were asked to indicate the extent to which a statement described
top management based on an eleven-point Likert-type scale anchored by 0 (Strongly
disagree) and 10 (Strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha was .94 in past studies for the
original five-point scale (Ellis & Shockley-Zalabak, 2001). Enlarging the range of the
scale allowed for greater variability and precision of the measurement (Hair et al. 2007).
Family Business Outcomes – Affective Commitment
The Allen & Meyer (1990) Affective Organizational Commitment scale was
utilized to measure commitment. Affective commitment has been the most prevalent
approach to measuring organizational commitment in extant literature (Colquitt et al.
2001). In addition, in prior family business literature the typical usage of the term
commitment is consistent with the definition of affective commitment (Sharma & Irving,
2005). The original scale contained eight statements with responses made on a sevenpoint Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (Strongly disagree) and 7 (Strongly agree). For this
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study, the statements were adapted slightly by reversing two of the four negatively
worded statements. Also, one statement was removed because of the possibility of
causing confusion in the family business setting and two new statements, more applicable
to the family business setting, were added. This adaptation resulted in a total of nine
statements. The Cronbach’s alpha of the original scale was .87 in prior research.
Appendix C includes a listing of the scale items and reliabilities for all the dependent
variables.
Independent Variable - Investment in an IAF
The investment in an IAF was defined as the percentage of dollars expended for
the IAF compared to total operating expenditures for the last fiscal year. This categorical
variable was used in order to analyze the relationship at differing levels of investment in
the IAF. Due to the sensitivity of business information for privately held family
businesses, this question included a range of percentages of expenditures. This approach
allowed the businesses to provide the requested data and maintain a certain level of
confidentiality. The ranges were determined during the pretest of the survey and
included seven choices from (1) = < 1 percent to (7) = > 10 percent.
Moderating Variable - Family Business Culture
The 12-item culture subscale of the Family – Power, Experience, Culture (F-PEC)
scale (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002) was used as one part of the process of
collecting the data necessary to measure the construct of family business culture. The FPEC culture subscale has been utilized in prior research to assess the extent to which
family and business values overlap and employees are committed to the business
(Astrachan et al. 2002; Holt et al. 2010; Klein et al. 2005). In the original scale three
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statements were measured on a five-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (Not at all) and
5 (To a large extent) and nine statements were measured on a five-point Likert-type scale
anchored by 1 (Strongly disagree) and 5 (Strongly agree). The original scales were
adapted to an eleven-point Likert-type scale anchored by 0 (Strongly disagree) and 10
(Strongly agree). The scales were expanded to increase the variability and precision of
the measurement (Hair et al. 2007). One double-barrelled statement was split into two
statements for a total of 13 statements. Cronbach’s alpha of .93 from prior research
suggests sound levels of internal consistency (Klein et al. 2005).
The Denison Organizational Culture Survey (Denison et al. 2004) assesses the
organizational culture of the business in the areas of involvement, consistency,
adaptability, and mission. This survey was the starting point for the second measurement
of culture to be included in the new family business culture construct (Denison et al.
2004). The survey is an established, globally recognized measurement of organizational
culture (Denison, Haaland, & Goelzer, 2003; Denison & Mishra, 1995; Fey & Denison,
2003; Yilmaz & Ergun, 2008). In addition, the survey has been used in prior research
related to recognizing and leveraging the unique strengths of family culture (Denison et
al. 2004).
Although organizational culture has many aspects, the extent to which members
of a privately held family business have shared goals and values is anticipated to
moderate the strength of the relationship between the investment in an IAF and family
business outcomes. Therefore, for this study the measurement of organizational culture
focused on two subsets of the Denison Organizational Culture Survey that examines these
characteristics; (1) core values and (2) goals and objectives. Each subset of the original
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scale was comprised of five items and used a five-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1
(Strongly disagree) and 5 (Strongly agree). The scale was adapted to a seven-point
Likert-type scale with the same anchors to allow for greater precision of the measurement
(Hair et al. 2007).
Core Values (subset of Consistency) utilizes five statements to measure the shared
core values and the ethical code of the family as literature has repeatedly shown that
family businesses are value or culture driven (e.g. Astrachan et al. 2002; Denison et al.
2004; Vallejo, 2011). Three statements were determined to be double-barrelled and were
revised for purposes of this research. In addition, one statement from Agreement (subset
of Consistency), “There is a strong culture” in this organization was included as an
overall measure of the perception of the strength of the organizational culture. The
Cronbach’s alpha for all 15 original statements of the Consistency index, including the
five statements from the Core Values subset, was .79 in prior research (Denison &
Mishra, 1995).
Goals and Objectives (subset of Mission) includes five statements to examine if
goals and objectives are understood, agreed upon, and tracked in the business. Lack of
understanding or disagreement of the goals of the business and the goals of the family
can impair the sustainability of the business (Mahto, Davis, Pearce, & Robinson, 2010;
Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997). The original 15 statements of the Mission index,
including the five statements from the Goals and Objectives subset, have exhibited a
Cronbach’s alpha of .81 in extant research (Denison & Mishra, 1995).
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Control Variables
Firm Size – Consistent with prior research the characteristic of firm size was
included as a control variable as larger firms are more apt to have an IAF (e.g., AbdelKhalik, 1993; Anderson, Francis, & Stokes, 1993; Carcello et al. 2005; Daily &
Dollinger, 1992). Firm size was measured by the natural log of the number of full-time
employees (Carey et al. 2000; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Mahto et al. 2010).
Firm Age (from inception) – Prior research has supported that as firms mature
and grow, more monitoring processes are often needed (e.g., Carcello et al. 2005;
Casillas, Moreno, & Barbero, 2010; Chrisman et al. 2004; Schulze et al. 2001). Firm age
was measured using the number of years the business has been in existence (Carey et al.
2000; Lindow et al. 2010; Sorenson, Goodpaster, Hedberg, & Yu, 2009).
Age of the IAF – The length of time in years that the IAF has been in operation
was included in the survey to differentiate between start up IAFs and more mature IAFs.
As the IAF and the business mature, the IAF may have experienced changes in structure
or extent. In addition, recently implemented IAFs may have stronger impacts on
employee perceptions of family business outcomes than IAFs that have been in place for
a period of time.
Industry – Five categorical variables of retail, service, manufacturing, wholesale,
and construction were utilized in order to identify the industry sectors in which the
responding businesses compete. Respondents were permitted to indicate a category of
Other that enabled the measurement of the five primary industry categories without overspecification (Casillas et al. 2010; Lindow et al. 2010; O'Boyle, Rutherford, & Pollack,
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2010). Financial services institutions were excluded from the data analysis since the
industry is highly regulated and may have compliance risks that mandate an IAF.
Education – The higher the level of education of respondents, the more
understanding, reasoning, and cognitive abilities they should possess, thus significantly
impacting the way the respondents perceive internal controls, such as an IAF (Hater &
Bass, 1988). The highest level of completed formal education was measured using the
following scale: (1) high school education, (2) technical college, (3) college graduate,
and (4) advanced degree (Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010).
Prior Work Experience – Respondents with prior work experience at an
organization with an IAF may consider the function more expected and commonplace.
Therefore, they may be less impacted than other employees. Respondents were asked the
number of years of experience that they have working for an organization with an IAF.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
The means, standard deviations, and correlations of all the variables are displayed
in Table 2. 2 A correlation matrix was used to examine multicollinearity. Three
correlations greater than .5 were identified between the dependent variables.
Multicollinearity would indicate that the independent variables have a substantial amount
of shared variance (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). This would decrease the
ability to assess the influence of each independent variable in predicting the dependent

2

Industry was initially included as a control variable. The regression results revealed it was not significant
and it was removed from the model.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable
Mean S.D.
1
2
3
1. Objective Financial Performance (a)
6.74 3.05
2. Subjective Financial Performance (b)
67.50 21.36 .11
3. Trust in the Business
6.13 0.85 .17 ** .34 **
4. Trust in Top Management (c)
9.84 1.69 .19 ** .24 ** .72 **
5. Affective Commitment
6.17 0.73 .22 ** .25 ** .69 **
6. Firm Size (d)
2.84 2.64 -.08
.32 ** -.04
7. Firm Age
17.49 14.68 -.08
.14 *
.03
8. Age of the IAF (e)
4.44 7.37 -.05
.20 ** .04
9. Education (f)
2.89 0.85 .08
.15 *
.01
10. Prior Work Experience with an IAF (g)
11.36 9.56 .01
.08
-.02
11. Investment in IAF (h)
1.45 1.91 -.02
.26 ** .07
12. Family Business Culture (i)
8.02 1.11 .20 ** .31 ** .82 **
n = 257, * = p < .05; ** = p < .01
Scales are (1) Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree unless otherwise indicated

4

5

6

.65 **
-.12
.04
.04
-.01
.15 *
-.01
.84 **

-.09
-.03
-.03
.12
.07
.04
.71 **

.13
.16
.41
.01
.44
-.09

*
*
**
**

7

8

9

.27 **
.13 *
.32 **
.11
-.01

.23 *
.44 **
.43 **
.02

.08
.28 **
.01

10

.07
.09

11

.01

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

Scale of (1) > -50% to (12) > 50%
Scale of (0) Very Dissatisfied to (100) Very Satisfied
Scale of (0) Strongly Disagree to (10) Strongly Agree
Full-time Employees (natural log)
In years
(1) High school, (2) Tech college, (3) College, or (4) Advanced
In years
n = 135 with 0 Investment, and n = 122: (1) < 1% = 32, (2) 1% - 2% = 21, (3) 3% - 4% =14, (4) 5% - 6% = 29, (5) 7% - 8% = 17,
(6) 9% - 10% = 8, and (7) > 10% = 1
(i) New construct - See Appendices A and B for more information
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variable. The results of the correlation matrix and the fact that the research model has
one independent variable and will examine the dependent variables separately resulted in
multicollinearity not presenting a problem.
Dependent Variables
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted for each of the five
dependent variables with the following results. The variables of objective financial
performance (ά = .94), trust in the business (ά = .80), and trust in top management (ά =
.98) loaded cleanly into individual factors with the indicated Cronbach’s alpha scores.
Affective commitment initially loaded into three factors requiring five iterations to result
in a final single factor (ά = .79). Appendix C displays the statements used to measure the
dependent variables, the factor loadings, and Cronbach’s alpha for each item.
Moderating Variable – Family Business Culture
An EFA was also performed on the 26 items of family business culture (15 F-PEC
items and 11 Denison items) to analyze the correlations among the items. A VARIMAX
orthogonal rotation method was used to simplify the columns of the factor analysis and
give a clear separation of the factors. Factor loadings were considered significant at .35
with the sample size of 257 (Hair et al. 2010). Three iterations of factor analysis resulted
in the removal of three Denison items. The remaining 23 items loaded into three factors.
The three factors had communalities at greater than .500, overall and individual item
measures of sampling adequacy of greater than .500, and 71.93 percent of the variance
explained. A Cronbach’s alpha was used as a diagnostic measure to assess the
consistency of the factors. Cronbach’s alphas of ά = .95, ά= .95, and ά = .80 were
evidence of high internal consistency within the three factors.
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Next, a second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was utilized to develop
the family business culture construct. The second-order factor model involves two layers
of latent constructs where the first-order constructs are viewed as indicators.
Theoretically, the F-PEC culture subscale items and the sub-sets of culture selected from
the Denison Organizational Culture Survey items share the same general level of
abstraction. Therefore, the first-order model meets the first requirement of theoretical
justification. Secondly, the three factors developed in the first-order factor analysis are
anticipated to influence other related constructs in the same way. And last, at least three
first-order constructs can be used in order to meet the minimum conditions for
identification and good measurement practice (Hair et al. 2010).
AMOS 17.0 was used to conduct the second-order factor analysis. The
modification indices (Standardized Regression Weights known as factor loadings in
SPSS) were reviewed and variables with the largest amounts were removed in order to
improve the model fit. Seven iterations were completed with an item removed in each
stage. The final model consisted of 16 items, had a Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA) of .079, a normed Chi-Square (CMIN/DF) of 2.6, and a
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .96 indicating acceptable model fit (Hair et al. 2010).
Convergent validity, the extent to which indicators of a construct converge or
share variance, was tested by assessing the loading estimates. Three loadings,
Standardized Regression Weights, did have amounts slightly below the .70 recommended
amount, but were still above the .50 acceptable amount (Hair et al. 2010). Internal
reliability was verified by a Cronbach’s alpha of ά= .94. Appendix A displays the final
second-order CFA. The rectangle boxes on Appendix A include the Statement numbers
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that refer to the complete Statements in the Statement # column in Appendix B. For
example, box S23_3 on Appendix A refers to S23_3 in the Statement # column of
Appendix B.
Appendix B includes (1) the original scale statements, (2) the revised statements
that were included in this survey, (3) the iterations completed in the EFA and secondorder CFA, and (4) the final loadings.
The average summated score was calculated for the remaining 16 items of the
family business culture construct, resulting in an average level of family business culture
for each respondent.
Hypotheses Tests
The conceptual model includes one nominal independent variable, one interval
moderator variable, five control variables and five interval dependent variables. This
structure indicates that multiple regression is the appropriate statistical tool (Hair et al.
2010). A test of skewness revealed that the average summated scale of family business
culture was negatively skewed. The variable was reflected by subtracting every
observation from the largest value of the variable plus one. The square root of each
observation was then calculated to achieve an acceptable level of skewness.
The moderating variable of family business culture was centered by subtracting
the mean from each observed data point. This shifts the scale and is beneficial in
calculating the interaction term. Centering reduces the correlation with the original
variables and helps interpretation of the regression coefficients. Centering the continuous
variables is recommended when calculating the interaction term to test for moderation.
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The five dependent variables were tested separately as the objective was to
examine the individual relationships between the independent variable and each
dependent variable, including any moderating influence. The results for each of the five
dependent variable models are displayed in the following tables. The moderation effect
of family business culture was tested consistent with the approach outlined by Cohen &
Cohen (1983) and Baron & Kenny (1986).
Model 1 of each table includes the results of testing the control variables, Model 2
includes the results for the main effects hypotheses tests, Model 3 displays the results for
the moderation and related hypotheses, and Model 4 includes all the variables and the
interaction term.
Table 3 indicates that the control variable of education level is significantly
related to objective financial performance (β = .52, p < .05). However, Hypothesis 1a is
not supported as the investment in an IAF was excluded from the model by the regression
analysis. Family business culture is statistically significant at β = 1.70, p < .01, and the
overall model remains significant at F = 2.65, p < .05. However, the interaction term is
not significant indicating no moderating effect and lack of support for Hypothesis 4a.
The results for subjective financial performance are included in Table 4. Firm
size and the age of the IAF are significant control variables, but once again the main
effect, Hypothesis 2b, was excluded from the regression model and not supported. The
moderator and interaction results are similar to objective financial performance and do
not provide support for Hypothesis 4b.
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TABLE 3
Regression Analysis - Objective Financial Performance
Model 1

Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees)
Firm Age
Age of the IAF
Education of the Respondent
Prior Work Experience with an IAF
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3: Moderator
Family Business Culture
Model 4: Interaction
Family Business Culture x $ IAF

-.15
-.02
-.03
.55 *
.02

Model 2

-.15
-.02
-.03
.55 *
.02

Model 3

Model 4

-.11
-.02
-.02
.52 *
.01

-.12
-.02
-.03
.52 *
.01

1.71 **

1.70 **

R²
.03
.03
.07
Adjusted R²
.01
.01
.05
F
1.70
1.70
3.10 **
n = 257, * = p < .05; ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficent betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)
(2) Refer to Table 2 for complete variable descriptions

.01
.07
.04
2.65 *
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TABLE 4
Regression Analysis - Subjective Financial Performance
Model 1

Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees)
Firm Age
Age of the IAF
Education of the Respondent
Prior Work Experience with an IAF
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3: Moderator
Family Business Culture
Model 4: Interaction
Family Business Culture x $ IAF

2.40 ***
.10
.40 *
-3.71
-.01

R²
.13
Adjusted R²
.11
F
7.51 ***
n = 257, * = p < .05; ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.

Model 2

2.40 ***
.10
.40 *
-3.71
-.01

.13
.11
7.51 ***

Model 3

2.80 ***
.12
.41 *
-.71
-.10

2.80 ***
.12
.41 *
-.71
-.10

21.96 ***

21.96 ***

.25
.24
14.12 ***

.25
.24
14.12 ***

Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficient betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)
(2) Refer to Table 2 for complete variable descriptions

Model 4
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Tables 5 through 7 3 display similar results for the remaining three dependent
variables of trust in the business, trust in top management, and affective commitment.
The overall models are significant at F = 80.26, p < .001, F = 82.67, p < .001, and F =
50.16, p < .001, respectively, and the moderator of family business culture is significant
in all three models. However, the main effect of Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 3 and the
moderation Hypotheses of 5a, 5b, and 6 are not supported.
An additional analysis was conducted to test for significant differences between
the means of the groups with an IAF (n = 122) and without an IAF (n = 135). A one-way
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed higher means for the respondents with an IAF
for all the dependent variables.
An analysis was also performed utilizing the independent variable of Yes = 1
having an IAF and 0 otherwise. Using this dichotomous independent variable resulted in
a statistically significant relationship between having an IAF and objective performance
(β = 1.02, p < .05) and having an IAF and subjective performance (β = 6.44, p < .05).
The interaction, once again, was not significant. In addition, the 122 business with an
IAF were separated from the full sample and the regression was run on just those
businesses with an IAF. The results did not reveal any statistical differences.
As a final test, the age of the IAF was divided into three dummy variables of (1)
less than 5 years, (2) between 5 and 9 years, and (3) more than 9 years. A one-way
ANOVA was used to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between
the means of the three groups. The businesses with an IAF in place for 5 to 9 years had
3

To analyze trust in top management the percentage of top management positions currently occupied by
members of the owning family was used as an additional control variable.
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TABLE 5
Regression Analysis - Trust in the Business

Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees)
Firm Age
Age of the IAF
Education of the Respondent
Prior Work Experience with an IAF
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3: Moderator
Family Business Culture
Model 4: Interaction
Family Business Culture x $ IAF

Model 1

Model 2

-.02
.00
.01
.02
-.01

-.02
.00
.01
.02
-.01

R²
.01
Adjusted R²
-.01
F
.36
n = 257, * = p < .05; ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.

Model 3

.02
.00
.01
-.02
-.01 ***

.01
.00
.01
-.02
-.01 ***

2.07 ***

2.07 ***
.02

.01
-.01
.36

.69
.68
93.46 ***

Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficient betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)

(2) Refer to Table 2 for complete variable descriptions

Model 4

.69
.68
80.26 ***
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TABLE 6
Regression Analysis - Trust in Top Management
Model 1

Model 3

Model 4

-.02
.00
.00
.01
.01

-.02
.00
.00
.01
.01

3.92 ***

3.92 ***

R²
.04
.04
.67
Adjusted R²
.02
.02
.66
F
1.96
1.96
82.67 ***
n = 257, * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficient betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)
(2) Refer to Table 2 for complete variable descriptions

.67
.66
82.67 ***

Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees)
Firm Age
Age of the IAF
Education of the Respondent
Prior Work Experience with an IAF
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3: Moderator
Family Business Culture
Model 4: Interaction
Family Business Culture x $ IAF

-.09
.00
.00
.07
.03 *

Model 2

-.09
.00
.00
.07
.03 *
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TABLE 7
Regression Analysis - Affective Commitment
Model 1

Model 1: Controls
Firm Size (ln # Employees)
Firm Age
Age of the IAF
Education of the Respondent
Prior Work Experience with an IAF
Model 2: Main Effects
$ IAF
Model 3: Moderator
Family Business Culture
Model 4: Interaction
Family Business Culture x $ IAF

-.04 *
.00
-.01
.17 **
.01

Model 2

-.04 *
.00
-.01
.17 **
.01

Model 3

Model 4

-.01
.00
-.01
.14 **
.00

-.01
.00
-.01
.14 **
.00

1.52 ***

1.52 ***

R²
.05
.05
.55
Adjusted R²
.03
.03
.54
F
2.40 *
2.40 *
50.16 ***
n = 257, * = p < .05; ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
Notes:
(1) Unstandardized coefficient betas are reported (Standardized betas for variables
excluded from the analysis by the stepwise regression are not reported)
(2) Refer to Table 2 for complete variable descriptions

.55
.54
50.16 ***
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the greater mean for all the dependent variables except subjective financial performance.
Group 3, businesses with an IAF of more than 9 years had the lowest means except in the
areas of subjective financial performance and trust in top management.
Additional Sensitivity Tests
Tests of normality, skewness, and kurtosis revealed acceptable ranges other than
the negative skewness of family business culture that was mentioned earlier. The
influence of outliers was determined by standardizing the scores of the variables. The
standard scores were calculated by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation for each variable (Hair et al. 2010). Six observations were identified that
exceeded the threshold value of 4 for larger sample sizes (n= > 80). The six observations
were excluded and the regression models were rerun. Outliers were not considered to
impact the results as the coefficient amounts had minor adjustments with no changes to
overall results or significance.
The design of the survey tool and statistical procedures were used to control for
common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003).
Although, the independent and dependent variables were collected from a single
respondent, the independent variable was reported as a range of percentages of
expenditures and was less open to perception bias. In addition, the measurement
statements for the moderating variable and the dependent variables were from established
validated scales. The scales were adapted slightly to eliminate vague, double-barrelled,
or outdated statements or terms. The endpoints and anchoring effects were extended to
increase variability in responses and further reduce common method bias (Hair et al.
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2010). For example, Likert-type scales were used with anchors of 1 to 7 and 0 to 10.
Sliding scales were also used with anchors of 0 to 100.
Common methods bias was also tested by entering the independent, dependent,
and moderator variables in a factor analysis (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Three factors were
extracted with eigenvalues > 1.0 and a total of 59.76 percent of the total variance
explained. The first variable accounted for 28.42 percent, the second variable 16.96
percent, and the third 14.39 percent of the total variance explained. The factors loaded
cleanly and no single factor accounted for the majority of the variance indicating that
common method bias was not considered to be an issue.
DISCUSSION
Findings and Implications
Research related to the outcomes of an IAF has been limited to date. This is
especially true in the area of privately held family businesses. Unlike their publicly
traded competitors, privately held family businesses are not bound by mandatory
reporting or auditing procedures. Even without a requirement to do so, some privately
held family businesses invest at differing levels in an IAF. This research takes the first
step in examining the outcomes of that investment.
Prior research suggests that some family businesses derive a competitive
advantage due their high levels of trust and organizational commitment (Eddleston et al.
2010; Vallejo, 2009). Research has indicated that family businesses often rely on trust
and organizational commitment as substitutes for other governance mechanisms, such as
an IAF. This poses the question of the benefits of an IAF to these businesses. An IAF
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can establish expectations, reliability, predictability and an environment conductive to a
beneficial exchange between employees and the business. The other side of the issue
suggests that if applied inappropriately the IAF can imply distrust and the need to
monitor.
The new construct of family business culture developed in this study is a
replicable measure of the influence of the combined cultures of the family and of the
business interacting within the business. The new construct has an internal reliability
score in the excellent range and provides a new method of measurement to conduct
research of family and business dynamics across family businesses. In addition, the new
construct of family business culture was a strong influence in all the models, but was not
significant as a moderating variable.
The results of this study reflect that the level of investment in IAF does not have a
significant influence on the outcomes of objective financial performance, subjective
financial performance, trust in the business, trust in top management, or affective
commitment.
Limitations and Future Research
The survey was designed, and statistical tests conducted, to manage the issue of
common method bias. However, the fact that survey data was gathered from a single
respondent is identified as a limitation of the study. The respondent needed to be
someone at a level to provide the financial information concerning the dollar investment
in an IAF and also the ranges of the three objective financial performance variables.
While this was the appropriate person for the financial information, the respondent could
have bias when responding to the perception statements in the scales. Multiple
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respondents from the same firm, at different organization levels and in different
responsibility areas could provide a more robust analysis in future research.
In addition, future research is needed to examine and validate the new construct of
family business culture. Although the construct did not reach the significance level in
this study related to the IAF, there are numerous opportunities to test the construct in
areas outside of governance mechanisms. The construct provides a measurement tool
that could be used to revisit prior research that has produced conflicting results. Research
in areas that have the potential to be influenced by variations in goals, core values, and
relationships could be prime beneficiaries of the construct.
Although the expected results were not obtained, this study has taken a first step
at examining the outcomes of the IAF in privately held family businesses. Prior research
has indicated that trust and affective commitment can create a competitive advantage for
family businesses. Therefore, identifying business processes and/or governance
mechanisms that can increase objective and subjective performance, and have a positive
impact on trust and affective commitment, could provide critical information to owners
and management. These businesses remain the predominant form of business structure in
the United States and globally and are largely unexplored research wise.
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APPENDIX A - Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for
Family Business Culture
(See Appendix B for a listing of the Statements – S Codes in the rectangles)
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APPENDIX B - Developing the Family Business Culture Construct
Original Statements

Statement # Revised Statements
See Appendix A

Denison Organizational
Culture

EFA

CFA

Loadings

In this business…….

The leaders and
managers “practice
what they preach”

S20

Top management
practices what they
preach

There is a characteristic
management style and a
distinct set of
management practices

S15

There is a distinct set of
management practices
(Double barrelled was
revised)

There is a clear and
consistent set of values
that govern the way we
do business

S26

There is a clear set of
values that governs the
way we do business

Ignoring core values
will get you in trouble

S42

Ignoring core values
will get you in trouble

There is an ethical code
that guides our behavior
and tells us right from
wrong

S21

There is an ethical code
that guides our behavior
and tells us right from
wrong

There is widespread
agreement about goals

S32

There is widespread
agreement about goals

Leaders set goals that
are ambitious, but
realistic

S41

Top management sets
goals that are
ambitious, but realistic

.620

The leadership has
“gone on the record”
about the objective we
are trying to meet

S47

Top management has
gone on record about
the objectives we are
trying to meet

.573

We continuously track
our progress against our
stated goals

S17

We continuously track
our progress against
stated goals

Removed
in Step 1

People understand what
needs to be done for us
to succeed in the long
run

S16

People understand what
needs to be done we
can succeed in the long
run

Removed
in Step 6

There is a “strong”
culture

S31

There is a strong culture
in this business

.768

Removed
in Step 7

.873

Removed
in Step 1
.876

Removed
in Step 2

Removed
in Step 3
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APPENDIX B - Developing the Family Business Culture Construct (continued)
Original Statements

Statement #

Revised Statements

EFA

CFA

Loadings

F-PEC- Culture
Your family has
influence on your
business

S28_4

The owning family has
a strong influence on
the business

.790

Your family and
business share similar
values

S18_3

The owning family
members and the
business share similar
values

.877

Your family members
share similar values

S23_6

The owning family
members share similar
values

.891

Family members
support the family
business in discussions
with friends,
employees, and other
family members

S18_9

Employees support the
family business in
discussions with others

.858

Family members feel
loyalty to the family
business

S23_2

Employees feel loyalty
to the family business

.938

Family members are
proud to tell others that
we are part of the
family business

S23_4

Employees are proud to
tell others that they are
part of the family
business

.860

There is so much to be
gained by participating
with the family
business on a long-term
basis

S23_1

There is much to be
gained by participating
with the family
business on a long-term
basis

.799

Family members agree
with the family
business goals, plans,
and policies

S28_2

Employees agree with
the family business
plans

Removed
in Step 2

Triple Barrelled
statement above was
divided into 3 separate
statements.

S18_1

Employees agree with
the family business
policies

Removed
in Step 4

S23_5

Employees agree with
the family business
goals

Removed
in Step 3
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APPENDIX B - Developing the Family Business Culture Construct (continued)
Original Statements

Statement #

Revised Statements

EFA

CFA

Loadings

Family members really
care about the fate of
the family business

S18_2

Employees really care
about the fate of the
family business

.584

Deciding to be involved
with the family
business has a positive
influence on my life

S18_4

Deciding to be involved
with the family
business has a positive
influence on my life

.832

I understand and
support my family’s
decisions regarding the
future of the family
business

S18_8

I understand the owning
family’s decisions
regarding the future of
the family business

Double Barrelled
statement above was
divided into 2 separate
statements.

S23_3

I support the owning
family’s decisions
regarding the future of
the family business

.938

Family members are
willing to put in a great
deal of effort beyond
that normally expected
to help the family
business be successful

S28_1

Employees are willing
to put in a great deal of
effort beyond that
normally expected to
help the family business
be successful

.869

Removed
in Step 5

APPENDIX C
SCALE ITEMS AND RELIABILITIES
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APPENDIX C - Scale Items and Reliabilities
Construct

Items

Objective Performance

12 point scale = > (50%) to > 50%
Return on Assets
Return on Equity
Return on Sales

Subjective Performance

Trust in the Business

Trust in Top Management:

Loadings

.94
.969
.949
.916

Sliding Scale = 0 to 100
Sales

.847

Market Share
Net Income
Return on Equity
Return on Assets
The Ability to Fund Growth
Overall Performance

.813
.893
.901
.895
.850
.741

7 point scale
In this business managers trust their
subordinates to make good decisions

.660

.94

.80

In this business if someone makes a
promise, others within the business
will almost always trust that the
person will do his or her best to keep
the promise

.857

There is a very high level of trust
throughout this business

.831

In this business subordinates have a
great deal of trust for managers

.861

11 point scale
In your opinion, top management:
Is sincere in their efforts to communicate
with employees
Listens to employees’ concerns
Keeps their commitments to employees
Is concerned about employees’ well being
Keeps their word to employees
Has my trust

ά

.98
.946
.943
.964
.949
.969
.855
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APPENDIX C – Scale Items and Reliabilities (continued)
Construct

Items

Affective Commitment

7 point scale
This business has a great deal of
personal meaning for me

Loadings

ά
.79

.642

I really feel as if this business’s
problems are my own

.817

I would be happy to spend the rest
of my career with this business

.783

I feel emotionally attached to
this business

.888

APPENDIX D
ENHANCING FAMILY BUSINESS SUCCESS SURVEY
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Enhancing Family Business Success Survey
(Adapted from the Qualtrics electronic survey tool)

Q1 Dear Family Business Associate, Your responses to this brief, confidential survey will
provide valuable information for your owners and managers to consider when looking for
options to improve the success of the business. This research will provide previously
unavailable information that can be used by your business as a benchmark when
assessing future changes. The Chief Financial Officer (or similarly titled position that
can provide ownership structure and process information) should complete the survey.
The estimated time for completion of the Chief Financial Officer survey is 20 to 25.
When answering questions containing the terms 'we' or 'our' please assume you are taking
the perspective of the employees in the company. If you are interrupted and need to step
away, just close the survey. When you click the link to reopen the survey, the survey will
open at the question you were answering. The research is completely confidential.
Individual and business names will not be maintained, nor released, at any point. Thank
you for your participation! Your responses by December 15, 2011 are greatly
appreciated!
Q2 Note - Your participation is voluntary and may be withdrawn without penalty. The
research has no risks to the respondents. By completing this survey you are agreeing to
participation in the research process. Research at Kennesaw State University that
involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional Review
Board.
Q3 Note - Question or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to Dr.
Christine Ziegler, Chairperson of the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State
University, 1000 Chastain Road, #2202, Kennesaw, GA 30144, (770) 423-6407.)
Q4 What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
Q5 How many years have you been with this business?
Q6 Are you a member of the owning family? (Family member is defined as offspring of
a couple, no matter what generation, their in-laws, and any legally adopted children.)
 Yes
 No
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Q7 Which of the following best describes your relationship?






Founder
Descendent of Founder
In-law
Legally Adopted
Other - Please specify ____________________

Q8 Which generation do you represent?






1st
2nd
3rd
4th
>4th

Q9 What is your position in the business? (Please check all that apply.)













Owner
Chairman
Board Member
President
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Operating Officer
Chief Financial Officer
Controller
Supervisor
Non-Supervisor
Internal Auditor
Other - Please Specify ____________________
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Q10 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your
personal opinion of your business environment:
Q11 I believe in this business:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q12 This business has a great deal of personal meaning for me:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q13 In this business managers trust their subordinates to make good decisions:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Q14 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your
personal opinion of your business environment:
Q15 In this business there is a distinct set of management practices:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q16 In this business people understand what needs to be done so we can succeed in the
long run:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q17 In this business we continuously track our progress against stated goals:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Q18 In your opinion, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following
statements:
Strongly Disagree
=0
Strongly Agree

10

0

=1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Employees agree
with the family
business policies





















Employees really
care about the fate of
the family business





















The owning family
members and the
business share
similar values





















Deciding to be
involved with the
family business has a
positive influence on
my life





















I understand the
owning family's
decisions regarding
the future of the
family business





















Employees support
the family business
in discussions with
others

































142

Q19 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your
personal opinion of your business environment:
Q20 In this business top management “practices what they preach”:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q21 In this business there is an ethical code that guides our behavior and tells us right
from wrong:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q22 I believe in the mission of the business:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Q23 In your opinion, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following
statements:
Strongly Disagree
=0
Strongly Agree
=1

0

10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

There is much to be
gained by
participating with
the family business
on a long-term basis

 

















Employees feel
loyalty to the family
business

 

















I support the owning
family's decisions
regarding the future  
of the family
business

















Employees are
proud to tell others
that they are part of
the family business

 

















Employees agree
with the family
business goals

 

















The owning family
members share
similar values
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Q24 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your
personal opinion of your business environment:
Q25 In this business if someone makes a promise, others within the business will almost
always trust that the person will do his or her best to keep the promise:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q26 In this business there is a clear set of values that governs the way we do business:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q27 I really feel as if this business’s problems are my own:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Q28 In your opinion, please rate the extent to which you agree with the following
statements:
Strongly Disagree
=0
Strongly Agree

0

=1

10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Employees are
willing to put in a
great deal of effort
beyond that
normally expected
to help the family
business be
successful





















Employees agree
with the family
business plans





















I support the
owning family's
decisions
regarding the
future of the
family business





















The owning
family has a
strong influence
on the business
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Q29 In your opinion, please rate the extent to which the following factors influence your
commitment to the business: (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the
scale. Not moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.)
______ Family Members of the Business
______ Business Goals
______ Personal Goals
______ Values of the Business
______ Personal Values

Q30 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your
personal opinion of your business environment:
Q31 There is a “strong” culture in this business:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q32 In this business there is widespread agreement about goals:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q33 I think that I could easily become as attached to another business as I am to this one:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Q34 Please indicate your satisfaction with the business’s performance in the following
areas for the Last Fiscal Year. (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the
scale. Not moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.)
______ Sales
______ Market Share
______ Net Income
______ Return on Equity
______ Return on Assets
______ The Ability to Fund Growth
______ Overall Performance
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Q35 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your
personal opinion of your business environment:
Q36 I enjoy discussing the business with people outside of the business:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q37 I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to the business:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q38 There is a very high level of trust throughout this business:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Q39 In your opinion, indicate the extent to which the following statements describe top
management within your family business:
Strongly Disagree
=0
Strongly Agree
= 10

0

10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Top management
Is sincere in their
efforts to
communicate
with employees





















Top management
listens to
employees'
concerns





















Top management
keeps their
commitments to
employees





















Top management
is concerned
about employees'
well being





















Top management
keeps their word
to employees





















Top management
has my trust
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Q40 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your
personal opinion of your business environment.
Q41 In this business top management sets goals that are ambitious, but realistic:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q42 In this business ignoring core values will get you in trouble:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q43 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this business:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Q44 Please place a 1 for Most Important, 2 for Second Most Important, and 3 for Third
Most Important in the boxes provided below to indicate the top 3 items of importance, to
you personally, for the business to accomplish:
______ Financial Performance
______ Employment of Family Members
______ Family Satisfaction
______ Family Independence
______ Respect of the Business in the Community
______ Write-in
______ Write-in
Q45 For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your
personal opinion of your business environment:
Q46 In this business subordinates have a great deal of trust for managers:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q47 In this business top management has “gone on record” about the objectives we are
trying to meet:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q48 I feel “emotionally attached” to this business:








Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Q49 How many years experience do you have working for an organization with an
Internal Auditing Function?
Q50 What is your age?
Q51 Please indicate your highest completed level of formal education:





High School
Tech College
College
Advanced

Q52 Are you the Chief Financial Officer (or a position having similar responsibilities)
that would be the appropriate person to provide information on the ownership structure
and performance of the business?
 Yes
 No
Q53 Please supply the following basic information:
What year was the business established?
Current number of full-time employees
Q54 The business is:
 Privately Held
 Publically Traded
Q55 What is the primary industry of the business?







Retail
Service
Manufacturing
Wholesale
Construction
Other - Please specify ____________________

Q56 What is the total number of top management positions in your business?
Q57 How many top management positions in the business are currently occupied by
family members? (Family member is defined as offspring of a couple, no matter what
generation, their in-laws, and any legally adopted children.)
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Q58 Please provide the following information concerning the structure of the business.
Please indicate the proportion of share ownership held by family members and nonfamily members: (The total must equal 100%.) (Family is defined as a group of
persons including those who are either offspring of a couple, no matter what generation,
and their in-laws, as well as their legally adopted children).
Family:

Family:

Voting/

Non-Voting/

Controlling
Shares (%)

Controlling
Shares (%)

Non-Family
Voting/

Non-Family:
Non-Voting/

Controlling
Shares (5)

Controlling
Shares (%)

Proportion
of Shares

Q59 Please indicate the percentages of ownership of the 5 largest owners: (If you do not
know exact percentages, please estimate.)
Percentage of Ownership
Largest Owner
Second Largest Owner
Third Largest Owner
Fourth Largest Owner
Fifth Largest Owner

Q60 Please check all boxes that apply:
1st

2nd

3rd

4th

Which generation(s)
owns the business?









Which generation(s)
manage(s) the business?









Greater
than 4th
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Q61 Does the business have a Board of Directors/Advisory Board?
 Yes
 No
Q62 Please provide the following information concerning members of the Board of
Directors/Advisory Board at this business: (Independent is defined as nonfamily,
nonemployee, and no business relationship with your business.) (Family member is
defined as offspring of a couple, no matter what generation, their in-laws, and any legally
adopted children.)
______ Number of Family Members
______ Number of Independent Members
Q63 How many members of the Board of Directors/Advisory Board are Female?

Q64 Please check all boxes that apply:
1st
Which generation(s)
serve(s) on the Board of
Directors?



2nd

3rd

4th







Greater
than 4th


Q65 How would you rate the Board of Directors/Advisory Board’s level of contribution
to the business’s success? (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the
scale. Not moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.)
______ Level of Contribution
Q66 Does the business have an Audit Committee?
 Yes
 No
Q68 How many members of the Audit Committee are Female?
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Q69 Please check all boxes
that apply:
Which generation(s) serve(s)
on the Audit Committee

1st



2nd



3rd

4th





Greater
than
4th


Q70 How would you rate the Audit Committee’s level of contribution to the business’s
success? (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the scale. Not moving
the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.)
______ Level of Contribution
Q71 How many external audits has the business had completed within the last 2 fiscal
years?







None
1
2
3
4
>4

Q72 Please check the category of firm performing the majority of the external audit(s):





International
National
Regional
Local

Q73 Does your business have an Internal Auditing Function?
 Yes
 No
Q74 How long has the Internal Auditing Function been in place? (Please write in the
number of years.)
Q75 To whom does the Internal Auditing Function report? (Please check all that apply.)
 President
 CEO
 CFO
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 Board of Directors
 Audit Committee
 Other - Please specify ____________________
Q76 What percentage of the Internal Auditing Function work is performed internally or
outsourced? (The total must equal 100%.)
______ Internally
______ Outsourced
Q77 For the percentage of the Internal Auditing Function work that is performed
internally, please indicate the number of internal staff in the Internal Auditing Function:
Q78 For the percentage of the Internal Auditing Function work that is performed
internally, how many of the Internal Auditing Function staff members are family
members? (Family member is defined as offspring of a couple, no matter what
generation, their in-laws, and any legally adopted children.)
Q79 Please indicate the dollar amount expended for the Internal Auditing Function as a
percentage of total operating expenditures for the Last Fiscal Year:








< 1%
1% - 2%
3% - 4%
5% - 6%
7% - 8%
9% - 10%
> 10%

Q80 For each of the following, select the one description that is most similar to your
Internal Auditing Function:
Q81 The style of our Internal Auditing Function would be described by our stakeholders
as:
 Corporate police
 Supportive
 Advisor
Q82 The perspective of our Internal Auditing Function is focused primarily on the:
 Past (retrospective look at what happened)
 Present
 Future (proactive approach to risk mitigation & control development)
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Q83 The responsibility of our Internal Auditing Function is to:
 Audit for compliance
 Audit and suggest
 Audit and consult
Q84 How would you rate the Internal Auditing Function’s level of contribution to the
business’s success? (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the scale.
Not moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.)
______ Level of Contribution
Q85 How likely is the business to implement an Internal Auditing Function within the
next 5 years? (Slide the Blue Bar to, or click on, the desired point on the scale. Not
moving the Blue Bar will record your answer as 0.)
______ Likelihood of Implementing an Internal Auditing Function within the next 5
years
Q86 How many adult family members participate actively in the business? (Participate
actively is defined as serves on the board, works in the business, and/or attends the
majority of meetings held by the business.)
Q87 How many family members do not participate actively in the business but are
interested?
Q88 How many family members are not (yet) interested at all?
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Q89 Please check one box for each performance item to indicate the appropriate range (in
%’s) for the Last Fiscal Year:

In %’s

> (50) (40) (30) (20) (10)
(50)
to
to
to
to
to

1

11

21

31

41

to

to

to

to

to

(41) (31) (21) (11)

10

20

30

40

50

0

>50

Return
on
Assets
Return
on
Equity
Return
on Sales

Q90 Please indicate if you are a licensed Certified Public Accountant?
 Yes
 No
Q91 Is your business a member of a Family Business Center at a college or university?
 Yes
 No
Q92 All the responses from your business are greatly appreciated! Please click the
next arrow one final time to submit your completed survey.

